Does the thaw in India-China ties indicate a 'new order' in Asian geopolitics?

New Delhi, Sep 4 (NationPress) The recent improvement in India-China relations is emerging as one of the most captivating phenomena in Asian geopolitics. For almost five years, the connection between these two civilizational powers was primarily characterized by mistrust, blame-shifting, and a significant drop in interactions.

The Galwan clash of 2020 was not merely a military encounter but a psychological fracture that undermined the diplomatic trust that had been painstakingly established since the early 1990s. It led to a halt in dialogue, disrupted trade routes, and severed the essential fabric of people-to-people connections that sustain long-term relationships.

However, as 2025 begins, both nations seem inclined to explore a limited yet visible thaw in relations. The pivotal question remains whether this cautious warming can pave the way for a lasting transformation.

The latest Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit held in Tianjin served as a significant backdrop for this re-engagement.

For the first time in seven years, an Indian Prime Minister stepped onto Chinese territory, engaging in dialogue with President Xi Jinping and conducting substantive discussions with senior Chinese officials.

This meeting was less about mere symbolism and more about recalibrating strategies. Both leaders, while exercising caution to avoid any premature show of warmth, utilized the occasion to probe potential collaboration in areas that extend beyond their disagreements.

Xi advocated for a multipolar order devoid of hegemonic dominance, whereas India seized the opportunity to emphasize the significance of connectivity, regional stability, and respect for sovereignty.

The mere act of sitting across from each other at a multilateral forum after years of chill indicated a likelihood of dialogue without compromising core interests.

However, summits alone cannot restore trust; the deeper implication of change lies in a renewed focus on people-centric engagement.

One of the noteworthy advancements in 2025 was the principle agreement to resume direct flights between India and China.

These air links, which were suspended following the border crisis, had become a powerful symbol of the strained ties.

Their reinstatement will not only alleviate travel challenges for students, business leaders, and families but also revitalize the tourism and services sectors.

Airlines from both nations are poised to capitalize on this, but more critically, the people-to-people benefits of such connectivity could reinvigorate a relationship reduced to strategic tensions. India’s insistence on negotiating a new Air Services Agreement, rather than hastily resuming flights, reflects a desire to balance economic interests with national security considerations.

Nonetheless, the very act of working on this agreement indicates a willingness to let engagement, rather than estrangement, guide policy.

Cultural diplomacy has also found renewed expression. The Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra, which had been suspended since the late 2010s, is set to resume in the summer of 2025.

For thousands of Indian pilgrims, this sacred journey holds profound emotional and spiritual significance. By reopening this corridor, China is not only permitting religious tourism but also extending an olive branch that resonates deeply with Indian society.

Such cultural gestures have historically served as tools of soft diplomacy, and their revival signifies that Beijing acknowledges the importance of social optics in enhancing relations.

Similarly, the gradual easing of visa issuance for Chinese nationals in India and the renewal of academic and media exchanges demonstrate a deliberate strategy aimed at reconstructing the connective fabric of societal interactions.

However, optimism must be tempered with realism. The thaw in India-China relations remains fragile and constrained. Border patrols continue to be vigilant, military disengagement at specific friction points is incomplete, and the broader security landscape in Asia is still influenced by strategic competition.

India’s worries regarding its trade imbalance with China, its restrictions on Chinese investments in sensitive sectors, and its caution regarding critical technologies remain firmly intact.

Likewise, China’s deepening strategic alliance with Pakistan and its assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific continue to be sources of concern in New Delhi.

The distrust is structural, not incidental, and thus cannot be eliminated through a few symbolic gestures. Yet, this very reason underlines why the current thaw warrants attention. Realists in international relations argue that rival powers, even amid conflict, often seek cooperation in mutually beneficial areas.

For India and China, the costs of enduring estrangement are substantial. Both nations are significant players in the global economy, with overlapping necessities in energy security, climate cooperation, and regional connectivity.

Trade, despite all the restrictions and deficits, continues to grow, highlighting a paradox: economic pragmatism persists even when political trust is minimal. The decision to restore flights and facilitate the movement of people reflects this pragmatism—recognizing that total decoupling is neither practical nor desirable.

The SCO summit reinforced this notion. India, while resisting any inclination towards China’s vision of a Sino-centric order, nevertheless engaged actively in discussions on counterterrorism, infrastructure development, and financial cooperation.

Xi Jinping’s offers of yuan-denominated aid and emphasis on South-South cooperation resonated with numerous members, but India navigated a careful path of engagement without alignment.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s side meetings, including one with Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi, were perceived by observers as more substantial than the fleeting handshake with Xi.

These parallel channels of diplomacy underscore India’s strategy of exploring incremental pathways without compromising its strategic autonomy.

The broader significance of people-to-people interactions must not be underestimated. In the decades leading up to Galwan, academic exchanges, tourism, cultural delegations, and business interactions created a buffer of familiarity that softened the hard edges of geopolitics.

The sudden halt of these connections hardened public perceptions and contributed to the portrayal of China as an adversary instead of a neighbor.

Re-establishing these links—through resumed flights, pilgrimages, academic collaborations, and media visits—can play a crucial role in gradually reshaping narratives. The political landscape may remain divided, but societal exposure has the potential to humanize the “other,” reducing the space for zero-sum thinking.

There is also a regional rationale for this thaw. South Asia remains one of the most vulnerable areas concerning development and security. From climate risks to fragile supply chains, the region cannot afford a prolonged confrontation between India and China.

Even minimal cooperation—sharing hydrological data on cross-border rivers, aligning on disaster relief, or coordinating public health efforts—can yield collective advantages. If Asia is to anchor a multipolar world order, its two most populous nations must at least be able to communicate, if not yet embrace.

The thaw, therefore, is less about transforming adversaries into allies and more about acknowledging the necessity of coexistence. What would a genuine turnaround entail?

First, a sustained commitment to gradual measures that broaden societal and economic linkages while leaving complex disputes for structured negotiations.

Second, an understanding that while strategic competition will persist, it can be managed without pervading every aspect of bilateral relations.

Third, the political resolve to withstand domestic pressures that thrive on demonizing the other. Both leaderships must persuade their constituents that engagement does not equate to capitulation, and that pragmatism frequently serves national interests more effectively than perpetual hostility.

The symbolism of Indian pilgrims embarking once again on the journey to Mansarovar, of Chinese students enrolling in Indian universities, or of flights transporting entrepreneurs across borders may seem modest compared to the significant strategic challenges of our time.

However, these modest symbols are precisely what can lay the groundwork for long-term stability. Grand strategies falter when public trust disintegrates; conversely, even fragile peace endures when societies invest in one another.

The thaw in India-China relations, then, is not an abrupt reconciliation but a gradual re-humanization of a fractured relationship.

If nurtured carefully, it could signify the commencement of pragmatic cohabitation between two giants who may never cease to compete but must learn to coexist. In the realm of global politics, that alone would represent a notable achievement.