Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is reportedly orchestrating the revival of Al-Umar Mujahideen — a largely defunct militant outfit founded in Srinagar in December 1989 — to resume operations in Jammu and Kashmir, according to an Intelligence Bureau (IB) official. The plan, as described by Indian security agencies, involves temporarily merging Al-Umar Mujahideen with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) before allowing it to operate independently in the Valley.

The ISI's Strategy: A 'Homegrown' Front

Indian intelligence agencies are closely monitoring Al-Umar Mujahideen following what officials describe as deliberate steps by the ISI to project a locally-rooted militant presence in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan, according to the IB official, prefers a group perceived as homegrown rather than one visibly directed from across the border. 'The Hizbul Mujahideen, which would have been the obvious choice for such an operation, is currently not ready for the job. Moreover, almost all its operatives are working alongside the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan,' the official said.

Al-Umar Mujahideen fits the ISI's requirements precisely because it has deep roots in the Valley and has been dormant since approximately 2006 — long enough, officials suggest, for its profile to have faded from active scrutiny.

Role of the Kashmir Study Group

The ISI reportedly relies on an internal body called the Kashmir Study Group to shape its strategy for the region. According to the IB official, the group is headed by two Pakistan Army officers of Brigadier and Colonel rank, and its recommendations guide all major ISI decisions relating to Jammu and Kashmir.

'The studies include the local problems that the people face and how to exploit them. It also makes recommendations to the ISI on how to use the various terror groups in Jammu and Kashmir,' the official said. It was this group, according to officials, that advised the ISI to merge the LeT, JeM, and Al-Umar Mujahideen for a consolidated operational push, while deliberately keeping Hizbul Mujahideen out of the immediate plan given the high level of scrutiny it faces from Indian agencies.

Who Is Al-Umar Mujahideen and Its Founder

Al-Umar Mujahideen was formed when it broke away from the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in December 1989. The split occurred over ideology: while the JKLF sought an independent and secular Kashmir, Al-Umar Mujahideen opted for an explicitly Islamist, pro-Pakistan agenda.

Its founder, Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar — also known as Mushtaq Latram — is currently based in Pakistan and has no known recent operational activity. Zargar had been arrested by Indian agencies in 1992, but was subsequently released as part of a hostage exchange following the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814, along with other militants including Masood Azhar. More recently, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) attached Zargar's properties under anti-terror laws.

Hizbul Mujahideen Sidelined for Now

Officials indicate that the ISI has consciously chosen not to activate Hizbul Mujahideen at this stage. Indian security agencies had, in recent years, significantly disrupted the outfit's operational ecosystem in the Valley — an effort that officials say remains fresh in both institutional memory and public awareness. Hizbul Mujahideen operatives are reportedly waiting at multiple launchpads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) alongside LeT and JeM cadres, and will, according to the officials, be given full operational control only at a later stage.

What Indian Agencies Are Watching

Security agencies are treating the reported revival plan as a credible threat, given the deliberate, phased nature of the alleged ISI blueprint. The plan envisages LeT and JeM holding and training Al-Umar Mujahideen initially, then releasing it to operate independently — lending it a veneer of organic, homegrown militancy. This comes amid broader Pakistani attempts, according to Indian officials, to sustain pressure on Jammu and Kashmir through proxies following operational setbacks to older networks in the region. How quickly the revival can be actualised will depend, analysts note, on ISI's ability to rebuild Al-Umar Mujahideen's cadre base in the Valley after nearly two decades of dormancy.