Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is quietly recalibrating its Kashmir strategy, shifting away from overt terror support toward a patient, covert effort to revive separatism through mainstream political and social networks, according to intelligence officials. The shift, flagged by Intelligence Bureau assessments, comes as direct infiltration attempts have dwindled and executing terror attacks inside the Valley has grown increasingly difficult under current security arrangements.

The ISI's New Playbook

An Intelligence Bureau official said the ISI's Kashmir Desk is in what they described as 'overdrive mode,' though its immediate focus is not on kinetic violence. 'The latest assessments do not suggest plans to carry out terror attacks in the Valley. They recognise that executing an attack has become difficult under the prevailing security arrangements. The prolonged lull in infiltration attempts is further adding to Pakistan's difficulties,' the official said.

Instead, the ISI's current strategy centres on infiltrating mainstream institutions — political parties, government services, schools, and colleges — by recruiting former separatists, one-time overground workers (OGWs), and disaffected youth identified through social media monitoring.

Former Separatists and OGWs in the Crosshairs

Intelligence officials say the ISI is approaching individuals once associated with the Hurriyat Conference and encouraging them to enter mainstream politics. A key vulnerability, officials note, is that many such individuals have had a 'cooling-off period' of five to six years with no fresh criminal activity, effectively dropping off active surveillance radars.

'The fact that there are no fresh police files on them also makes them potential recruits for the ISI,' an official said. The ISI, according to these assessments, plans to recruit such persons 'in very large numbers' and have them penetrate mainstream institutions gradually.

Notably, the ISI is also scouting social media for young Kashmiris whose posts indicate even mild discontent against the state. 'Posts put up by the youths that even suggest a slight bit of discontent against the State are quickly picked up by the recruiters,' the official added.

A Deliberate Shift from Loud Separatism

This strategy marks a stark departure from the era of figures like S A S Geelani, Asiya Andra, and Yasin Malik, who openly propagated pro-Pakistan positions, organised protests, and encouraged groups such as the Hizbul Mujahideen. The ISI, officials say, recognises that replicating such overt methods would immediately attract sedition laws and security crackdowns.

The new model envisions separatist discourse moving into canteens, classrooms, and private conversations — away from public meetings and social media platforms that security agencies monitor. 'Such topics also would not make it to social media or another public platform. These are issues which would be discussed between two to three people in canteens and similar places,' an official explained.

This is, officials argue, significantly more dangerous than the previous iteration. 'This is a sure and slow way to penetrate the ecosystem without getting noticed or charged by the law enforcement agencies,' one official said.

The Three-to-Four Year Horizon

According to the assessments, the ISI is prepared to wait out three to four years before its objectives bear fruit. 'The Pakistani intelligence agency is prepared to play the long game, even if it takes three to four years to achieve its objectives. Violence is not part of its immediate strategy. Instead, the aim is to bring separatism back into the public discourse by using mainstream political and social networks,' the official said.

Officials also flagged that some political parties in Jammu and Kashmir are already 'speaking the language of separatism,' which, they said, is aligning with ISI narratives — though no parties were named in the assessments shared with reporters.

Security Implications

The abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019 effectively dismantled the institutional infrastructure of separatism in the Valley. Pakistan's difficulty in rebuilding that infrastructure overtly has, according to officials, pushed the ISI toward this covert, gradualist approach. Counter-intelligence agencies are now grappling with a challenge that sits at the intersection of law enforcement, political monitoring, and civil liberties — detecting radicalisation that is, by design, invisible.

Agencies are expected to recalibrate surveillance frameworks to account for this non-violent but ideologically subversive mode of infiltration, officials indicated.