Is NATO Shifting Its Focus to the Indo-Pacific with India's Strategic Role?

New Delhi, June 29 (NationPress) The NATO summit that took place in The Hague from June 24-25 may be remembered more for its forward-looking pivot rather than its urgent reaffirmations regarding support for Ukraine, increased defense spending, and condemnation of Iranian strikes. The Indo-Pacific has now assumed a central role in NATO's strategic framework as the Indo-Mediterranean region descends into conflict.

This shift marks a significant change. Throughout its post–Cold War existence, NATO's focus remained primarily on the Atlantic. Even when it extended its reach to areas like Afghanistan or Libya, it operated under the assumption that security threats originated from Europe. The notion that Asia could influence Euro-Atlantic stability was once deemed speculative; however, that belief has now been overturned.

NATO's engagement with the Indo-Pacific began before the Ukraine conflict. In the late 2010s and early 2020s, the alliance started to cultivate closer ties with democratic Indo-Pacific nations such as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand, eventually formalizing these relationships through the "IP4" format. However, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 and China's alignment with Moscow sharpened Brussels' perspective. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept explicitly noted that China’s coercive policies challenge our interests, security, and values. At The Hague, this stance was further reinforced, identifying China not only as a systemic rival but also as a "decisive enabler" of Russia's military actions.

Despite this, NATO's ambitions are intentionally limited. The alliance does not aim to form an Indo-Pacific bloc, nor should it attempt to replicate its Euro-Atlantic structure in Asia. Instead, it seeks what could be termed "strategic elasticity"—flexible partnerships, practical coordination, and technological interoperability that bolster deterrence without necessitating formal alliances.

This is where India plays a crucial role—not as an ally, but as a vital partner.

India remains steadfast in its commitment to strategic autonomy and non-alignment. It is not a member of the IP4 and has no intention of seeking NATO membership or treaty obligations. Historically, New Delhi has resisted bloc politics and maintains strong ties with Moscow, even as it diversifies its defense strategies. However, this autonomy should not be mistaken for indifference. In recent years, India has articulated a proactive Indo-Pacific agenda, highlighted by its SAGAR doctrine—Security and Growth for All in the Region—and more recently, the 'Mahasagar' initiative, launched in late 2024.

The term Mahasagar (Sanskrit for "great ocean") underscores India’s ambition to emerge as the principal architect of stability in the Western Indo-Pacific. This initiative encompasses maritime domain awareness, defense-industrial collaboration, and coordination of the blue economy across the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the African coast.

Significantly, it also envisions interoperability with like-minded navies and integration of underwater surveillance and cyber capabilities. While it is not targeted at any specific entity, Mahasagar serves as a strategic counterbalance to China's Belt and Road naval encirclement of the Indian Ocean.

India's involvement in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—comprising the United States, Japan, and Australia—positions it as a key player in countering China's influence. However, the Quad is not a military alliance; it operates through consensus and capacity building.

NATO, conversely, contributes something complementary to India’s strategic framework: institutional experience, shared standards, and operational maturity in areas like cyber, AI, and undersea deterrence. While the Quad aligns visions, NATO aligns capabilities.

Practical examples of this collaboration are already visible. In 2024, India engaged in joint drills with the Italian aircraft carrier Nave Cavour, showcasing high-level interoperability. It has participated in multilateral operations such as Sea Dragon alongside the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada. NATO has also established pathways for defense technology integration with regional partners.

During the summit in The Hague, new initiatives were introduced in cyber defense, counter-disinformation, AI, and dual-use industrial cooperation—all areas of increasing interest and capability for India.

Of course, these interactions will not lead to formal alliance structures. New Delhi is not poised to sign a collective defense agreement, nor will it permit NATO bases. However, this is not what the current situation necessitates. Instead, it demands pragmatic, modular cooperation—shared exercises, aligned technical standards, and secure communication frameworks that enable both parties to jointly address maritime instability, cyber threats, and supply chain vulnerabilities.

A deeper systemic rationale also exists for this engagement. Trade routes through the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait are not abstract issues for Europe; nearly 40% of global trade passes through these waters. A limited conflict—such as one over Taiwan—would instantly disrupt global supply chains, inflate commodity prices, and destabilize energy flows. In essence, Euro-Atlantic security is no longer confined to geography but is defined by connectivity. India, positioned at the strategic intersection of East and West, is uniquely situated to assist NATO in navigating this transition.

All of this does not undermine India's enduring preference for autonomy. In fact, NATO's attraction lies in its ability to collaborate with India without infringing upon that principle. A partnership without formal alliance is emerging—a relationship based on complementary interests rather than identical identities.

Looking forward, NATO must resist replicating its Atlantic model in the Indo-Pacific. Instead, it should build on the logic of flexible geometry: deep engagement with the IP4, tailored collaboration with India, and cross-platform initiatives involving the Quad and EU Indo-Pacific strategies. For India, this presents an opportunity to shape the regional order while preserving its independence. For NATO, it offers a pathway to remain globally relevant without overextending.

The future of deterrence will not be determined by static treaties but by dynamic networks. As the international order becomes more fragmented and new coalitions form, NATO and India possess a narrow yet critical opportunity to forge one of the most significant security partnerships of the century—one that values autonomy, avoids entanglement, and is anchored in shared strategic necessity.

Vas Shenoy is the Chief Representative for Italy, Indian Chamber of Commerce. He is an Italian analyst, author, and entrepreneur.