New Delhi, Sep 21 (NationPress) In the chaotic aftermath of the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the newly sovereign nations of India and Pakistan faced a multitude of intricate and often volatile issues. One of the most critical was the integration of over 500 princely states, which were granted the option to join either nation or remain independent under the Indian Independence Act of 1947.

While most states made decisions influenced by geographical proximity and the predominant religion of their populace, a few became focal points of intense contention. The situation in Junagadh, a princely state located in Kathiawar, emerged as one of the earliest and most crucial constitutional and diplomatic crises, establishing a contentious precedent for the broader conflict regarding Jammu and Kashmir.

At the core of this crisis was a frantic exchange of communications between New Delhi and Karachi. A key document in this dialogue was the telegram (34-GG) dispatched by India's Ministry of External Affairs to its Pakistani counterpart on September 21, 1947.

This message, while one of many, encapsulated the fundamental legal, political, and strategic arguments that shaped the Junagadh dispute and underscored the deep-rooted mistrust that characterized the early Indo-Pakistani relations.

Context: The Contested Accession

Junagadh presented a constitutional anomaly. Despite having a majority Hindu population (over 80 per cent), it was governed by a Muslim Nawab, Mohammad Mahabat Khanji III. Surrounded by Indian states that had acceded to India, the Nawab, swayed by his Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, declared his intention to join Pakistan on August 15, 1947. Pakistan formally accepted this accession on September 12, 1947.

This decision faced immediate and strong opposition from the Government of India, which was grounded in several crucial principles:

1. Geographical Contiguity: Junagadh was not land-contiguous with Pakistan, a factor India deemed essential for a viable and peaceful accession.

2. Will of the People: India contended that the accession disregarded the wishes of the predominantly Hindu population, a position ironically contrasting India's stance on Kashmir, where it upheld the ruler's right to accede.

3. Economic and Administrative Disruption: The accession of Junagadh to Pakistan posed a threat to the administrative and economic cohesion of the Kathiawar region, creating a foreign territory within India.

The Diplomatic Barrage: September 1947

Following Pakistan's acceptance of Junagadh's accession, a rapid exchange of telegrams between the two governments ensued.

September 12: Upon learning of Pakistan's acceptance, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru cabled his Pakistani counterpart, Liaquat Ali Khan, asserting that India could "never and do not acquiesce in" the accession, labeling it an "encroachment on India’s Sovereignty and territory" and a breach of the principles governing partition. On the same day, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry informed India that it had accepted the accession.

September 17: The Indian Cabinet convened and resolved to oppose the accession, planning necessary measures, such as economic pressure and troop deployment along the state's borders.

September 19: Amid escalating tensions, Pakistan accused India of preparing to invade Junagadh with "armed men from Indian Union territory."

The Telegram 34-GG of September 21, 1947: India's Definitive Stand

Against this backdrop of mounting tensions and mutual accusations, India sent its telegram, No. 34-GG, on September 21, 1947. This communication served as a detailed rebuttal to Pakistan's claims made on September 19 and formally articulated India's rejection of the accession. Key points include:

1. Rejection of Pakistani Allegations: The telegram categorically denied Pakistan’s assertions that India was preparing an invasion, stating, "allegations regarding armed men preparing to invade Junagadh and create disturbances there from Indian Union territory are entirely baseless." This denial was crucial for India to maintain the moral high ground and frame its subsequent actions—an economic blockade and troop movements—as defensive measures aimed at preserving regional stability.

2. Assertion of the Will of the People: The communication strongly reiterated India's position that the accession was illegitimate as it overlooked the popular will. It emphasized that there was "overwhelming evidence of desire of vast majority of people of Junagadh to remain in Indian Union despite accession of State to Pakistan." This strategic reasoning displayed India's inconsistent application of principles to serve its national interests while upholding the ruler's legal right to choose in Kashmir.

3. Legitimizing the Provisional Government: The telegram sought to legitimize the "Arzi Hukumat" or Provisional Government formed by Junagadh citizens in Bombay under the leadership of Samaldas Gandhi. It framed the movement as a popular uprising against the Nawab's decision, stating that the people "have decided to resist decision by all means at their disposal and have set up a provisional Government." By portraying the Arzi Hukumat as a legitimate expression of popular will, India created a political tool to challenge the Nawab’s authority from within and justify its support for the anti-accession movement.

4. A Veiled Threat and a Call for Reversal: The telegram concluded with a stern warning and a clear demand. It stated that India "cannot be expected to acquiesce in a situation in which a State with overwhelming non-Muslim population which is geographically and economically an integral part of India is driven into acceding to Pakistan against the known wishes of the people." This was followed by an explicit request for Pakistan to reconsider its acceptance of the accession, effectively offering a diplomatic avenue to avoid direct conflict.

Aftermath and Analysis

The telegram of September 21 did not ease the crisis; instead, it entrenched the irreconcilable positions of both nations. Pakistan responded on September 22, reaffirming that the accession was "complete, final and irrevocable" and warned India that any interference would be deemed an "act of aggression" against Pakistan.

The Indian government tightened its economic blockade, halting essential supplies to Junagadh while moving troops to the state's borders to "restore order." This strategy, combined with the actions of the Arzi Hukumat, which began capturing outlying territories of Junagadh, created an untenable situation for the state administration.

The crisis peaked in late October and early November 1947. With the state's economy crumbling and facing imminent invasion, the Nawab fled to Karachi. His Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, requested the Government of India to take control of the administration on November 8, 1947. Indian forces entered Junagadh on November 9, and a plebiscite held in February 1948 resulted in an overwhelming vote favoring accession to India.

Consequently, the telegram from September 21, 1947 stands as a pivotal historical document. It showcases the fundamental ideological and geopolitical clash between India and Pakistan during their formative years. For India, the principles of geographical integrity and popular will were paramount, while for Pakistan, the legal right of a princely ruler to accede—especially a Muslim ruler—was central to its claims, forming part of a broader vision to create "multiple artificial entities" based on the platform of Islam.

Conclusion: Junagadh, A Microcosm of a Fractured Relationship

The Junagadh crisis, encapsulated in documents like Telegram 34-GG dated September 21, 1947, serves as a profound and insightful microcosm of the foundational fractures that would shape India-Pakistan relations for decades. This single communication, though concise, encapsulates the key elements of the emerging conflict: Pakistan's reliance on legal formalism versus India's insistence on geographical and popular realities, all unfolding against a backdrop of rapidly escalating mistrust.

In the telegram, India’s Ministry of External Affairs dismisses Pakistan's complaints about the "economic blockade" of Junagadh, asserting that any disruptions were a natural consequence of the state's abrupt disconnection from its geographical and economic hinterland after aligning with Pakistan. This document is not merely a diplomatic exchange; it is a declaration of India’s fundamental stance, highlighting the view that Pakistan’s acceptance of Junagadh's accession was a politically opportunistic move—an attempt to establish an artificial entity "hundreds of miles away from its shores" on the same ideological grounds that gave rise to Pakistan itself. This action was perceived by New Delhi as illogical and a deliberate provocation aimed at undermining India's consolidation during the tumultuous post-partition period.

The Junagadh affair, as illustrated by this exchange, reveals the fundamentally opposed principles guiding the two new nations. Pakistan, in its claims over Junagadh, clung to the "legal and constitutional" right of a ruler to accede to either dominion, a principle publicly championed by its Prime Minister. In contrast, India argued that such legalism was a "fraud" when it contradicted geographical contiguity, economic viability, and, most importantly, the people's will.

This fundamental clash—between a ruler's legal prerogative and the people's democratic aspirations—would become the enduring battleground for the much more complex and prolonged conflict over Jammu and Kashmir.

In conclusion, the Junagadh episode was a precursor that established a pattern of mutual suspicion and blame that tainted bilateral relations from the outset. Documents from this time illustrate how swiftly Junagadh became entangled with accusations of sabotage, military posturing, and a propaganda war that depicted the other side as an aggressor intent on destruction. The crisis revealed Pakistan's early ambition to challenge India's territorial integrity beyond the immediate boundaries of Partition and India's determination to counter such moves decisively, setting a precedent for future confrontations.

Thus, Telegram 34-GG and the events that followed are not mere historical footnotes; they represent the opening chapter in a tragic narrative of conflict, showcasing that the seeds of discord were sown not just in the fields of Punjab or the valleys of Kashmir, but also along the shores of Kathiawar.

(The author is a researcher specializing in Indian history and contemporary geopolitical affairs)