A new geopolitical analysis has argued that Pakistan is fundamentally the wrong intermediary for translating Washington's sustained pressure on Tehran into actionable outcomes — because Islamabad has too much at stake in preserving its own working relationship with Iran. The report, published in Real Clear Defense, warns that Tehran retains several levers to make any deterioration in ties with Pakistan economically and strategically painful for Islamabad.

Iran's Narrowing Room, Pakistan's Conflicted Position

According to the report, renewed US sanctions, tightening restrictions on Iranian financial and commercial networks, pressure on oil revenues, and the accumulated economic costs of conflict have significantly constrained Tehran's room for manoeuvre after months of negotiations failed to yield the desired results.

Yet rather than pushing Islamabad toward harder pressure on Iran, these dynamics pull Pakistan in the opposite direction. The report notes that American sanctions directly obstruct Pakistani plans for Iranian energy imports and expanded bilateral trade — placing Islamabad in the uncomfortable position of advising Washington on concessions that would simultaneously benefit Pakistan itself.

The Stalled Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline

One of the clearest illustrations of this conflict of interest is the long-stalled Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Iran has reportedly built substantial infrastructure on its side of the border, while Pakistan has repeatedly postponed construction on its section, caught between a dire energy shortage and the constraints imposed by US sanctions.

Tehran has since pressed Islamabad to honour its contractual commitments and warned of potential financial penalties, according to the report. The prospect of sanctions relief could, in theory, clear this major hurdle for Pakistan's own energy ambitions — giving Islamabad a direct incentive to soften rather than sharpen pressure on Iran.

Strategic Interests Pushing Islamabad Toward De-escalation

The report identifies a web of strategic interests that consistently push Pakistan toward de-escalation at precisely the moments when sustained pressure might have forced Iran into harder choices.

'China, Pakistan's indispensable strategic partner, purchases Iranian petroleum and wants reliable Gulf energy flows. Pakistan's military leadership has also used mediation to rebuild its political relevance in Washington by presenting access to Tehran as a valuable diplomatic asset,' the report stated.

Additionally, Pakistan's defence commitments to Saudi Arabia — centred on the Mecca defence arrangement — theoretically expose it to Iranian support for the Houthis, making Iranian restraint valuable to Islamabad regardless of what Tehran offers Washington, the analysis noted.

Balochistan: Iran's Economic Pressure Point

The report highlights Balochistan as a particularly acute vulnerability. Iranian petrol and diesel reportedly flow into Pakistan through entrenched smuggling networks across the province, sustaining traders, storage operators, retailers, and border communities. While Pakistani authorities conduct periodic enforcement operations, the report notes that commercial networks are 'largely left intact.'

'Stronger restrictions on Iranian petroleum reach beyond Tehran's revenues into a Pakistani border economy whose disruption creates problems for Islamabad,' the report stated. It added that Tehran could further tighten fuel flows, customs procedures, or border commerce from its side, while parts of Pakistani Balochistan — including areas around the Makran coast — rely on Iranian electricity, giving Tehran additional means of applying economic pressure in a province already contending with separatist violence and weak development indicators.

What the Analysis Implies

Taken together, the report argues that Pakistan is 'hardly a neutral party' in the US-Iran standoff. Confrontation with Tehran threatens stability along an already volatile frontier and could force Islamabad to divert scarce security resources from other priorities. The structural conflicts of interest identified in the analysis suggest that any US strategy relying on Pakistan as a conduit for pressure on Iran may be built on a fundamentally flawed assumption about where Islamabad's incentives actually lie.