Kabul: Pakistan is striving to portray itself as a nation under siege, claiming it is targeted by militants purportedly operating from Afghan territory, which has compelled it to undertake unilateral military measures for the safety of its citizens. Yet, when viewed through the lens of historical context, this narrative reveals significant contradictions. The current frustrations faced by Pakistan are inextricably linked to its long-held policies in Afghanistan—policies that have intentionally fostered militancy, institutionalized proxy warfare, and regarded Afghanistan more as a strategic asset than as a sovereign neighbor.

The origins of this predicament trace back to the late 1970s. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan emerged as the primary hub for the anti-Soviet jihad. With substantial financial and military support from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s security apparatus, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), took charge of supplying weapons, funds, and training to Afghan combatants. Refugee camps along Pakistan’s borders gradually evolved into militarized zones, serving both as recruitment centers and ideological breeding grounds. While this system was initially rationalized as a response to Soviet incursion, it persisted long after the Soviet withdrawal, solidifying its permanence.

During the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, Pakistan intensified its involvement by supporting the Taliban. Islamabad perceived the Taliban as a stabilizing force in line with its interests, ensuring a government in Kabul that would be amenable to Pakistan and securing what its strategists referred to as “strategic depth” against India. Pakistani madrassas provided ideological indoctrination, while Pakistani territory facilitated logistical support, and local advisors contributed operational assistance.

By 1996, when the Taliban seized control of Kabul, Pakistan was among the only three nations to formally recognize their regime. This was not an instance of neglect or loss of control; it represented a deliberate state strategy. Former Pakistani officials, Western diplomats, and intelligence evaluations have consistently acknowledged that the Taliban's ascendancy was closely tied to Pakistan's support. Afghanistan became, in essence, a proving ground for Pakistan’s theory that non-state actors could be employed to influence regional dynamics without long-term ramifications.

Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan publicly aligned itself with the global 'war on terror'. However, its actual approach remained selective. Although Pakistan did confront some militant factions, others were discreetly tolerated or protected, especially those targeting Afghanistan rather than Pakistan. A notable example is the Haqqani Network, which operated with relative impunity from Pakistani soil for years, orchestrating significant attacks in Kabul while enjoying safe havens across the border.

This dual approach gradually eroded trust. Afghan authorities repeatedly accused Pakistan of maintaining a double standard, presenting intelligence reports and evidence of training camps, financial networks, and command structures operating from its territory. These accusations were generally dismissed by Islamabad as mere propaganda. Nonetheless, United Nations monitoring teams and independent security analysts consistently corroborated the existence of Afghan insurgent groups within Pakistan well into the 2010s. The disparity between Pakistan’s assertions and observable realities solidified Afghan perceptions of Islamabad as lacking sincerity.

Pakistan’s rationale for this strategy was rooted in the belief that Afghanistan should remain within its sphere of influence. The concept of strategic depth treated Afghan land as a fallback in case of conflict with India, failing to recognize Afghanistan as an autonomous state with its own national interests. Militants were seen as instruments within this framework—valuable as long as they aligned with Pakistani objectives. This instrumentalization of violence undermined Afghanistan’s political progress and normalized perpetual insecurity. The outcomes of this strategy were predictable. Militancy does not remain confined within borders or policy frameworks.

Over time, ideological extremism and armed factions began to infiltrate Pakistan, leading to the emergence of groups that directly challenged the Pakistani state. The line between “good” and “bad” militants blurred, leaving Pakistan to contend with the very forces it had previously nurtured. Despite the intensifying internal violence, Islamabad continued to externalize blame, accusing Afghanistan while evading serious self-reflection on its own actions. Afghanistan, in turn, has paid a tremendous price; decades of proxy warfare have devastated institutions, displaced millions, and entrenched cycles of violence. For many Afghans, Pakistan's current grievances resonate as selective amnesia. One cannot cultivate militant infrastructure for decades and then disavow it when it becomes inconvenient.

The current phase of hostility reveals the extent of deteriorating relations. The dynamic has shifted from mutual suspicion to overt confrontation. Forces that Pakistan previously deemed ideological allies are now regarded as adversaries, exposing the transactional and fragile nature of that alliance. Border tensions exacerbate the situation, with the contentious Durand Line remaining a focal point of discord. Pakistan’s initiatives to fence and militarize the border are perceived in Afghanistan as unilateral and coercive, while Pakistan interprets Afghan resistance as lawlessness. Each skirmish reinforces nationalist sentiments on both sides, rendering compromise politically unfeasible and justifying militarization.

Islamabad is now facing the limitations of a policy that relied on militancy without accountability. The instruments it once employed to exert influence now operate autonomously, aligned with interests that no longer fully coincide with Pakistan’s security requirements. For Afghanistan, the challenge lies in navigating this animosity while striving to assert its sovereignty after years of interference. Afghan animosity towards Pakistan is not fabricated; it is grounded in lived experience. A sustainable improvement in relations would necessitate Pakistan abandoning denial, recognizing the repercussions of its past actions, and treating Afghanistan as an equal rather than a subordinate entity.

The current nadir in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations is not characterized by a single statement or border clash. It is the cumulative result of decades of policy decisions that prioritized short-term strategic benefits over long-term regional stability. Unless Pakistan confronts this history candidly, its frustration will persist as a narrative of victimhood, and accountability will continue to be substituted by threats. Geography dictates that Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot evade each other. Neither nation can attain peace through coercion, denial, or proxy warfare. This ongoing crisis underscores how far their relationship has declined, but it also reveals a fundamental truth: stability cannot emerge from the debris of manipulated militancy. Without a decisive departure from the past, this low point risks transforming into a new norm.