New Delhi, March 25 (NationPress) The United States' leading Intelligence official, Tulsi Gabbard, has identified Pakistan as a nation whose advancing missile capabilities may ultimately extend to the US. During her presentation of the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Gabbard highlighted that Pakistan is actively developing innovative and traditional missile delivery systems capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads, positioning the US within their strike range.

Pakistan has categorically rejected these claims, asserting that its strategic capabilities are strictly defensive, aimed at protecting its national sovereignty and fostering peace in the region. However, the US maintains that Pakistan is persistently enhancing its sophisticated technological capabilities.

There is a stark disparity between Pakistan's professed doctrine of 'credible deterrence' and the actual scale of its global military activities. Islamabad asserts that its nuclear and missile endeavors are primarily directed towards India. However, the development of the Shaheen-III missile, which boasts a range of approximately 2,750 kilometers, along with the Ababeel missile, capable of deploying multiple independently targetable warheads, indicates that Pakistan's ambitions extend beyond immediate regional needs.

Research group Disinfo Lab, which focuses on information warfare and psychological operations, has reported in a series of posts on X that Pakistan has one of the most infamous records for proliferating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They assert that one does not develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities for a neighbor situated 2,750 kilometers away. This reference pertains to the Shaheen-III, which can reach cities like Tehran, indicating Pakistan's technical aspirations towards longer-range delivery systems.

Officials argue that if Pakistan's deterrence is limited to India, then the pursuit of capabilities that transcend this operational scope raises questions. Disinfo Lab has also drawn attention to the proliferation network established by Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely acknowledged as the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program. This network, one of the most extensive in modern history, is known to have supplied sensitive nuclear technologies to countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya, operating through a complex web of intermediaries.

While Pakistan asserts that it has distanced itself from Khan's operations, the legacy of his network continues to influence how global intelligence agencies interpret its contemporary actions. Since 2023, the US has imposed sanctions on numerous entities linked to Pakistan's missile and nuclear initiatives, encompassing both domestic and foreign suppliers, notably from China. Key players include state-affiliated organizations such as the National Development Complex (NDC) and AERO, responsible for procuring cruise missiles and strategic UAVs.

AERO, despite being blacklisted in 2014, has managed to obtain sensitive components through intermediary firms. Many of these entities lack public transparency, identifiable workforces, and clear financial practices. Recent sanctions have particularly highlighted the role of Chinese firms, accused of supplying critical components ranging from filament winding machines to sophisticated welding systems essential for missile production. These technologies fall under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which imposes restrictions on the proliferation of systems capable of delivering payloads exceeding 500 kilograms beyond 300 kilometers. Notably, Pakistan is not a signatory to the MTCR, limiting its ability to acquire such technologies legitimately.

US findings suggest that this situation has led to the development of covert procurement routes involving intermediaries based in Karachi, front-end trading firms, and dual-use equipment masquerading as legitimate goods. Between 2023 and 2025, the United States conducted multiple rounds of sanctions targeting entities associated with Pakistan's missile program, grounded in intelligence assessments that revealed active procurement attempts, ongoing program expansion, and potential diversion risks.

Officials express concern that Pakistan's weapons program is not static or confined to a regional scope. Instead, it is advancing technologically, expanding its procurement networks, and operating through increasingly opaque channels. Despite projecting its nuclear arsenal as a limited defensive shield, the evidence suggests that Pakistan is illicitly augmenting its missile and nuclear capabilities. Observers note that the focus has shifted from merely deterring threats in South Asia to a program that raises significant and alarming concerns. Experts contend that, given the extensive information available regarding Pakistan's true intentions, the narrative of minimum deterrence has proven to be a mere façade.