Southeast Asia haze crisis needs stronger national action, not just ASEAN: Report

Share:
Audio Loading voice…
Southeast Asia haze crisis needs stronger national action, not just ASEAN: Report

Synopsis

A new report argues that ASEAN's repeated haze frameworks have amounted to little more than managed optics — and that the 2015 fires, which burned 2.6 million hectares and cost US$16.1 billion, prove the cycle will continue unless member governments stop outsourcing accountability to a bloc with no enforcement power.

Key Takeaways

A Eurasia Review report warns that ASEAN alone cannot deliver a lasting solution to Southeast Asia's haze crisis .
The 1997–98 fires destroyed nearly 100,000 sq km of land, costing an estimated US$9 billion .
The 2015 outbreak burned 2.6 million hectares , causing economic losses of US$16.1 billion .
Root causes — land-clearing by burning, peatland mismanagement, and plantation interests — remain structurally unaddressed.
ASEAN has no enforcement power to penalise member states or compel compliance with its own haze agreements.
Three regional frameworks since 2002 have produced minimal on-ground results, the report states.

A lasting solution to Southeast Asia's recurring haze crisis will require individual member governments to take direct responsibility and strengthen domestic legal frameworks — and cannot rest on ASEAN alone, according to a report published in Eurasia Review. The assessment, released on 31 October 2026, underscores a growing consensus that regional coordination mechanisms have repeatedly fallen short of delivering structural change.

ASEAN's Role and Its Limits

The report acknowledges that ASEAN can serve as a useful platform for coordinating regional responses and providing technical assistance. However, it warns that treating the bloc as the primary vehicle for solutions risks reducing it to what the report calls a 'feel-good factor' — a stage for visible action without meaningful reform.

'Every few years the same grey settles over the region, and almost identical script is repeated, where concerns are raised, and actions are promised, but impact has been scarce,' the report stated. It added that when domestic or bilateral action is limited, 'ASEAN is seen as the convenient platform to be seen where at least efforts are made to address the long-held conundrum.'

Scale of Past Crises

The report draws on two landmark episodes to illustrate the recurring and worsening nature of the crisis. During the 1997–98 fires, nearly 100,000 square kilometres of land were ravaged, causing estimated losses of around US$9 billion. The 2015 outbreak was even more severe — 2.6 million hectares burned, resulting in economic losses of US$16.1 billion. Despite the human and financial toll being well-documented, the underlying causes have gone unresolved.

Root Causes and Structural Failures

The report identifies the primary drivers of the crisis as land-clearing by burning, poor peatland management, plantation economic interests, and weak enforcement at the local level. Critically, it argues that El Niño — frequently cited as a trigger — 'cannot be singled out as the sole convenient reason to set aside human and institutional responsibility.'

Three structural weaknesses are highlighted. First, the root causes are embedded in economic structures and land use, with significant commercial interests at stake. Second, the capacity and political will to enforce laws vary considerably between central governments, local administrations, and enforcement agencies. Third, and most fundamentally, ASEAN itself has no enforcement power to penalise member states or compel compliance with regional rules.

Regional Agreements That Have Underdelivered

The report traces ASEAN's attempts to address the crisis through successive frameworks: the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, followed by haze-free roadmaps for 2016–2020 and 2023–2030. Progress in translating these agreements into effective ground-level action has, it says, been minimal.

'As long as the priority is confined to emergency response rather than structural reform and prevention, the problem will persist,' the report concluded. The assessment leaves little ambiguity: without genuine national accountability and institutional reform within member states, future haze seasons will follow the same familiar script.

Point of View

By the report's own assessment, minimal results — yet the cycle of summits, pledges, and inaction continues. What is missing is not regional architecture but domestic political will, particularly in plantation-heavy economies where enforcement cuts against powerful economic interests. Until governments treat haze as a law-and-order and land-governance failure rather than a weather event, ASEAN frameworks will remain a legitimising backdrop for inaction rather than a driver of change.
NationPress
31 Oct 2026

Frequently Asked Questions

Why can't ASEAN alone solve Southeast Asia's haze crisis?
ASEAN has no enforcement power to penalise member states or compel compliance with regional haze agreements. The report argues this structural limitation means lasting solutions must come from individual governments strengthening domestic legal frameworks and enforcement.
What were the biggest haze crises in Southeast Asia?
The two most severe episodes were the 1997–98 fires, which burned nearly 100,000 square kilometres and caused losses of around US$9 billion, and the 2015 outbreak, when 2.6 million hectares burned and economic losses reached US$16.1 billion.
What causes Southeast Asia's recurring haze problem?
The report identifies land-clearing by burning, poor peatland management, plantation economic interests, and weak local enforcement as the primary drivers. It cautions against attributing the crisis solely to El Niño, noting that human and institutional responsibility cannot be set aside.
What regional agreements exist to address the haze crisis?
ASEAN has pursued the issue through the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and successive haze-free roadmaps covering 2016–2020 and 2023–2030. The report says progress in converting these agreements into effective action has been minimal.
What structural changes does the report recommend?
The report calls for a shift from emergency response to structural reform and prevention, with member governments taking direct responsibility. This includes closing gaps between central and local enforcement capacity and reducing the influence of commercial plantation interests on land-use decisions.
Nation Press
The Trail

Connected Dots

Tracing the thread behind this story — newest first.

8 Dots
  1. Latest 2 months ago
  2. 3 months ago
  3. 10 months ago
  4. 1 year ago
  5. 1 year ago
  6. 1 year ago
  7. 1 year ago
  8. 1 year ago
Google Prefer NP
On Google