China's strategic push to dominate seaports in Bangladesh — a key gateway to the Bay of Bengal and the broader Indian Ocean — has run into a significant obstacle, with Dhaka systematically awarding major port contracts to Western and non-Chinese international operators, according to a report by the Bricklane News portal. The development signals a deliberate hedging strategy by Bangladesh's government to balance Chinese investment against strategic overreach.

The Maersk Deal and the Chittagong Pivot

In the latest and most consequential move, the Chittagong Port Authority has signed a 30-year agreement with Maersk Group of Denmark — one of the world's leading terminal operators — to design, finance, build, and operate the Ladia Container Terminal at Chittagong Port under a public-private-partnership framework. Chittagong is Bangladesh's primary trade hub, handling the bulk of the country's export and import cargo.

This is not an isolated decision. The Patenga Container Terminal, the first terminal at Chittagong to be operated by a foreign firm, is now run by Saudi firm Red Sea Gateway Terminal, which was commissioned for operations in June 2025. Additionally, a contract was awarded to state-owned Indonesian firm PT Pertamina Trans Kontinental to operate and maintain a facility at Cox's Bazar for five years.

China's Foothold: What It Has, What It Wants

China's engagement in Bangladesh's port sector is not negligible. Chinese firms are currently supplying port machinery at Chittagong, building nearby industrial parks, and positioning themselves for upcoming terminal modernisation projects. The China Economic and Industrial Zone at Anwara in Chittagong — spanning 800 acres — is under construction under a government-to-government initiative, designed to attract export-oriented investment from China and other countries.

During Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's visit to Beijing in June 2025, it was reportedly agreed that China would develop Mongla Port, with two state-of-the-art container jetties to be built under a China-funded project to enhance the port's handling capacity. Mongla, located closer to Dhaka than Chittagong, serves as a significant hub for Bangladesh's garment industry trade.

Why Mongla Alone Is Not Enough for Beijing

Analysts quoted in the report point out that Mongla Port, situated approximately 100 km from the sea as a river port, is not suitable as a naval hub. For Beijing's broader ambitions — controlling key shipping lanes for global energy supplies and advancing its so-called 'string of pearls' strategy of encircling India with a network of friendly ports — Mongla falls short. At Chittagong, meanwhile, the growing presence of major global players backed by Western powers would make any Chinese naval positioning highly conspicuous.

Notably, the report observes that Beijing's commercial interests are still served: the Anwara industrial zone advances Chinese exports, and Mongla's development supports garment trade flows. But strategic leverage over Indian Ocean shipping routes remains out of reach, for now.

India's Sensitivities and the Hasina Precedent

The broader pattern of limiting Chinese access to Bangladeshi seaports predates the current Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had reportedly taken note of India's concerns over increased Chinese commercial and technical presence at maritime assets in close strategic proximity to Indian territory, and declined to sanction the construction of a deep seaport at Sonadia with Chinese assistance.

Both the agreement for Matarbari Port — backed by concessional loans from the Japan Overseas Cooperation Agency (JOCA) — and the Ladia Container Terminal deal with Maersk were signed in 2025 under the interim government, reinforcing that the multi-operator strategy has bipartisan roots in Dhaka's port policy.

Dhaka's Calculated Balancing Act

The emerging picture, according to the report, is of a Bangladesh that is willing to absorb Chinese capital for export-sector development while carefully denying Beijing the operational and strategic toehold it seeks. With global port operators from Denmark, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia now active at its terminals, Bangladesh appears to be internationalising its port management as a structural hedge against any single power's dominance.

How China responds to this pattern — and whether it recalibrates its Bangladesh engagement — will be closely watched across the region, particularly in New Delhi.