CMBC stalled: China's Myanmar gamble exposes BRI's strategic limits
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
The proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor (CMBC) faces mounting feasibility questions in Dhaka, as Myanmar's Rakhine State descends deeper into conflict and Bangladesh withholds any formal commitment to the project. The corridor, floated following Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman's recent visit to China, has run headlong into ground realities that diplomatic blueprints have so far failed to account for.
Bangladesh's Cautious Stance
Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman, speaking to the media on 27 June, said Bangladesh was 'currently examining' the CMBC proposal and had 'taken no position' on it. He added that any overland connectivity through Myanmar would remain explicitly conditional on the restoration of peace and stability in Rakhine State. An analytical piece in The Daily Star, Bangladesh's prominent English-language daily, argued that while the corridor looks attractive on paper, it is not a viable near-term option. 'For now, its prospects are shaped less by diplomatic agreements than by the realities inside Myanmar,' the article stated.
The Rakhine Problem
The ground situation in Rakhine State is the corridor's central obstacle. The Arakan Army — an ethnic armed organisation seeking greater autonomy — now controls 14 of 17 townships in the region, leaving Myanmar's military government clinging to Kyaukphyu, Sittwe, and Manaung. Critically, Kyaukphyu, the proposed site of a Chinese-backed deep-sea port, is reportedly under siege, with skirmishes occurring within two kilometres of junta naval bases. Chinese-backed projects in the area have already been dismantled or suspended due to insecurity. According to The Daily Star's assessment, even under optimistic conditions — fighting subsiding, financing secured, construction proceeding without major interruptions — the Muse-Mandalay railway alone would likely require close to a decade to complete.
The Rohingya Dimension
For Bangladesh, the CMBC is inseparable from the Rohingya crisis. Dhaka hosts approximately 1.2 million Rohingya refugees, whose numbers have continued to grow as renewed violence in Rakhine State drives fresh displacement. Dhaka has consistently argued that progress on regional connectivity should be accompanied by conditions enabling the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of these refugees. With fighting worsening, the corridor carries significant political and diplomatic risk for Bangladesh's government.
China's Broader Strategic Pattern
China's persistence in Myanmar is not an isolated calculation. In Afghanistan, Beijing's interest is reportedly driven as much by security imperatives — specifically, preventing Uyghur separatists from finding sanctuary across its shared borderlands — as by economic expansion. In Pakistan, Chinese engineers, infrastructure, and diplomatic sites working under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have faced repeated attacks, reportedly by separatists, despite heightened security arrangements and counterterrorism measures. In Nepal, infrastructure projects near the strategically sensitive Siliguri Corridor — also known as the 'Chicken's Neck' — suggest motives that extend well beyond trade facilitation. Taken together, analysts argue, Beijing's calculus blends economic corridors as instruments of geopolitical influence with security buffers against challenges to its authority at the periphery.
What Comes Next
The CMBC, as currently envisioned, appears stalled by the dual constraints of Myanmar's fragmentation and Dhaka's deliberate diplomatic caution. Bangladesh's immediate priorities, according to The Daily Star's analysis, are likely to remain bilateral projects that can advance today, while the corridor is evaluated as a longer-term possibility rather than a near-term development strategy. China's willingness to absorb investment risk and diplomatic setbacks — as demonstrated in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and now Myanmar — suggests Beijing will not abandon the corridor concept. Whether that persistence translates into a viable project, or remains a tool of strategic signalling, will depend on how the conflict in Rakhine State evolves.