India's banking model offers Latin America a reform blueprint: Analysis
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
India's hard-won experience with fiscal discipline and bank failures — from the collapse of Yes Bank to the PMC Bank crisis — offers a ready-made reform template for Latin American countries grappling with similar vulnerabilities, according to an analysis in India Narrative. The trigger for the comparison is the recent collapse of Paraguay's largest digital lender, Ueno Bank, and the broader fiscal and regulatory missteps that preceded it.
Paraguay's Fiscal Framework: Promise and Breach
Paraguay built a structurally sound macroeconomic architecture over the past two decades. Its Fiscal Responsibility Law, introduced in 2003, caps the central government deficit at 1.5 per cent of GDP. The Central Bank of Paraguay (BCP) operates an inflation-targeting regime at 3.5 per cent, with a band of two percentage points on either side — a design strikingly close to India's own Monetary Policy Committee framework of 4 (plus or minus) 2 per cent, introduced in 2016.
The discipline showed results. By January, Paraguay's inflation had eased to 2.7 per cent, below the target. Public debt stood at roughly 36 per cent of GDP as of April. Moody's awarded Paraguay its first investment-grade rating in July 2024, followed by S&P in December 2025 — a cohort that in South America includes only Chile, Peru, and Uruguay with S&P, while Brazil and Colombia remain at BB.
Yet successive governments breached or suspended the deficit ceiling in nearly every year since 2019. The 2026 budget, signed on 31 December, was intended as a return to fiscal rules — but on the very same day, the government recognised outstanding arrears worth $1.27 billion to drug suppliers and road contractors. By August, the current year's deficit was tracking at 3.2 per cent, with the next year projected at 3.9 per cent and the deficit ceiling effectively pushed to 2028.
The parallel with India is direct. India's own Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, introduced in 2003, saw its targets deferred so repeatedly that the N.K. Singh Committee recommended a debt anchor in 2017. The IMF's review in June made a comparable recommendation to Paraguay — introduce a debt anchor and shift to accrual-based expenditure recognition, so that arrears cannot be obscured through delayed payments.
The Ueno Bank Collapse: A Supervisory Failure
The failure of Ueno Bank carries a more direct cautionary lesson. During the first half of this year, the digital lender's loan book expanded by approximately 30 per cent while deposits grew by only 10 per cent — a classic mismatch signal. Compounding the concern, Paraguay President Santiago Peña had earlier appointed the then-head of Ueno, Carlos Carvallo, as chief of the BCP — the very regulator responsible for supervising the bank.
The analysis draws a sharp comparison with India's own regulatory lapses. Yes Bank continued reporting healthy capital ratios even as its loan book was laden with stressed corporate exposures. PMC Bank concealed its concentration risk in real estate firm HDIL behind thousands of dummy accounts. In both cases, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) possessed the statutory powers needed to intervene — but acted late. The article argues that a supervisor who owes their appointment to the institution they oversee will act even later.
Where Paraguay Got the Resolution Right
Despite the failures, Paraguay's crisis response offers a model worth replicating. The country's Deposit Guarantee Law, also introduced in 2003, insures deposits of up to 75 monthly minimum wages per depositor — equivalent to approximately $28,000. The guarantee fund issued at least provisional payments to 93 per cent of 1.87 million insured depositors within a week, disbursing roughly $340 million in just five days.
India's comparable journey was far slower and more painful. Depositors of PMC Bank endured a prolonged wait before relief arrived. It required the raising of Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) cover to ₹5 lakh in 2020 and an amendment to the DICGC Act in 2021 to establish a 90-day payment timeline. Paraguay's resolution mechanism compressed that journey into days.
The Reform Blueprint for Latin America
The analysis outlines a sequenced reform agenda for other Latin American economies. The foundation — a deficit ceiling law, an independent inflation-targeting central bank, and a rapid-payout deposit guarantee fund — is already embedded in Paraguay's architecture. What needs to be added is a debt anchor to prevent arrear-driven evasion of fiscal rules, an accrual-based accounting system to surface hidden liabilities, and a strict conflict-of-interest regime that imposes cooling-off periods on movement between bank ownership, supervision, and governance.
Notably, the article observes that India required roughly two decades and two major bank failures to internalise both sets of lessons. Latin America, it argues, can absorb the same lessons from Paraguay's compressed two-year experience — at a significantly lower cost.