Congress president emeritus Sonia Gandhi has disclosed, in her memoir Belonging: A Journey of Love, the profound moral conflict she endured when the party weighed forming an alliance with the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) — the very party whose cadre had, in her account, openly supported the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the group responsible for the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The revelation offers an unusually candid window into the personal cost of coalition-building in post-liberalisation Indian politics.

The Wound That Would Not Heal

Gandhi writes that the early 2000s presented what seemed like an opportune moment for opposition forces to consolidate against the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government. Yet the prospect of partnering with the DMK triggered a deep personal crisis. She recounts that DMK cadre had been vocal backers of the LTTE during the 1991 elections, and that some within the party had gone so far as to openly threaten Rajiv Gandhi.

The Jain Commission report of 1997, which held a DMK leader responsible for tacitly aiding the Tamil assassins, had already forced the Indian National Congress (INC) to withdraw support from the IK Gujral government — a precedent that made any reconciliation even more fraught. 'With those painful memories returning to torment me, I'd ask myself, "What should I do? If I join hands with them, won't it amount to a betrayal of Rajiv?"' Gandhi writes in the memoir.

A Pragmatic Calculation — and a Difficult Call

Gandhi then describes how she weighed a counterfactual: 'Perhaps Rajiv himself would have gone ahead with this alliance, if he knew it was necessary to strengthen our front against the BJP.' That reasoning, however tentative, helped tip the balance. She describes making the first telephone call to DMK patriarch M. Karunanidhi with 'her heart in her mouth and hands trembling.'

Despite the two leaders sharing no common language, Gandhi writes that the initial conversation was cordial. Over subsequent meetings, they reportedly discovered common ground in the arts, literature, and Tamil heritage, gradually building a working relationship that transcended its turbulent origins.

From Personal Reconciliation to the UPA

Party colleagues on both sides eventually worked out seat-sharing arrangements and campaign coordination. The process culminated in the formal launch of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) on 4 May 2004 — a coalition that went on to form the government at the Centre for two consecutive terms. The Congress-DMK partnership proved electorally decisive in Tamil Nadu, a state the BJP has historically struggled to penetrate on its own.

This is the first time Gandhi has spoken at length about the psychological toll that forging this alliance exacted. Earlier accounts of the UPA's formation had largely focused on its structural architecture rather than the intimate deliberations behind it.

DMK's Response

DMK leader TKS Elangovan responded to the memoir's revelations, stating that Gandhi had aligned with the DMK because it was the only viable path to challenging the BJP in Tamil Nadu. He reiterated that the DMK had always championed the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils and categorically rejected any suggestion that the party had endorsed the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

What This Means for India's Coalition History

The passages Gandhi devotes to this episode shed rare light on how personal grief and political necessity intersect at the highest levels of Indian governance. They also underscore how the UPA's founding was not merely a transactional exercise but one laden with emotional and ethical stakes that leaders rarely acknowledge publicly. As India's coalition era continues to evolve, Gandhi's account serves as a reminder that the architecture of alliances is often built on deeply personal — and deeply painful — compromises.