Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has sharply reduced its reliance on local Kashmiri recruits and is instead deploying Pakistani nationals through Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) for long-haul terror operations in Jammu and Kashmir, according to Indian intelligence officials. The strategic shift, reportedly decided at high-level meetings in Pakistan in recent months, reflects the ISI's assessment that local militants are too vulnerable to sustain extended ground operations.

Why the ISI Is Moving Away from Local Recruits

According to an Intelligence Bureau official, there has been a significant drop in the recruitment of locals to fight alongside JeM or LeT. The official said the ISI views Pakistani nationals as better suited for protracted operations — capable of waiting for months inside dense jungles before striking on command.

Local recruits, by contrast, are considered operationally fragile. Security forces have repeatedly leveraged family pressure to secure surrenders, and those who are captured tend to disclose communication and logistics networks during interrogation. Officials say a local militant's effective lifespan on the ground rarely exceeds two to three months before being eliminated or apprehended.

The Decline of Local Militancy in Kashmir

Intelligence officials attribute the drying up of local recruitment to a broader collapse in militant morale following a sustained series of security force encounters. The Hizbul Mujahideen, once the dominant local outfit, reportedly never recovered from the elimination of its cadre in successive counter-insurgency operations.

The death of Burhan Wani and others who followed is cited as a turning point. Youth who had been radicalised during that period grew progressively demoralised. Officials note that stone-pelting — once a visible indicator of street-level unrest — also subsided significantly in the period that followed.

The abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 is credited by officials with accelerating this shift, with increased development activity and economic opportunity reportedly drawing youth away from militancy.

ISI's Smokescreen Groups and Deniability Architecture

Even as Pakistani nationals take on ground operations, the ISI has reportedly constructed a parallel layer of proxy outfits designed to claim responsibility for attacks and provide Islamabad with plausible deniability. Groups such as The Resistance Front, Kashmir Tigers, All Tigers, and the People's Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) have been created for this purpose.

These outfits, officials say, are deliberately given secular-sounding names and are staffed primarily by locals operating in the digital space. Their role is limited to claiming attacks publicly — the actual operations are carried out by JeM or LeT cadres. The ISI has reportedly ensured that these digital-front operatives have minimal knowledge of actual operational details, limiting the intelligence value of any arrests.

Over-Ground Workers Fill the Local Gap

While locals are being sidelined from active militancy, the ISI has simultaneously expanded its over-ground worker (OGW) network in Jammu and Kashmir. OGWs are not combatants; they provide logistics, shelter, and local navigation support to foreign terrorists who are unfamiliar with the terrain.

Officials explain that this division of roles is deliberate — OGWs know the geography but are kept in the dark about operational specifics, reducing the risk of critical intelligence leaking to Indian security agencies even if an OGW is detained.

As the ISI recalibrates its approach, Indian security forces are expected to adapt counter-insurgency tactics to account for a more patient, better-trained adversary operating in smaller, harder-to-detect cells.