Pakistan using ISKP to pressure Taliban, Baloch rebels: Report
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
Pakistan appears to be extending patronage to the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) — also known as ISIS-K or Daesh Khorasan — not out of ideological alignment, but as a calculated strategic instrument to pressure both the Afghan Taliban and Baloch insurgents, according to a detailed report published in Tanzania-based The Citizen.
The Core Allegation
Moroccan researcher and journalist Fatima El Hashimi, writing in The Citizen, argued that available evidence points to a deliberate Pakistani policy choice rather than an enforcement failure. 'Today, the evidence suggests that Pakistan appears to be extending patronage to ISKP — not out of ideological sympathy, but as a calculated instrument of pressure against both the Afghan Taliban and Baloch insurgents. The international community needs to pay attention to this development as it can have global implications,' she wrote.
On 30 June, reports emerged of cross-border activity between Afghanistan and Pakistan, centred on alleged ISKP hideouts. According to the report, such incidents have recurred repeatedly in recent years as Islamabad has sought to counter the Taliban through other militant proxies in the region.
Pakistan-Taliban Relations and the TTP Factor
The report traces the roots of Pakistan's alleged pivot to a sharp deterioration in Islamabad–Kabul relations since August 2021. Cross-border skirmishes between Pakistani and Afghan forces have grown in both frequency and intensity. Notably, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) reportedly launched over 1,000 attacks in 2025 alone, inflicting significant casualties on Pakistani security forces across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. All mediation efforts between the two sides have, according to the report, yielded no tangible outcome.
The Balochistan Dimension
Simultaneously, Baloch armed groups have escalated attacks on security forces and critical infrastructure in Balochistan, including projects linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China has reportedly raised concerns about the safety of its personnel and investments at the highest levels in Islamabad, placing Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir under serious pressure to deliver results.
Munir's response — a 'hard state' policy of coercion in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan — has, critics argue, further alienated Pashtun and Baloch communities and deepened the crisis rather than resolving it.
At a United Nations (UN) forum in 2024, Baloch National Movement (BNM) chairman Naseem Baloch stated that ISIS training camps in Balochistan operate under Pakistani military oversight. This claim aligns with separate reporting that local pro-military outfits established ISKP facilities in Mastung and Khuzdar — districts reportedly used both to suppress Baloch resistance and as launchpads for attacks inside Afghanistan.
The Grey-Zone Strategy
Hashimi's report also flags that in 2025, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leadership reportedly convened a meeting in Balochistan, pledging armed struggle against what it termed 'anti-Pakistan' forces — a category that included Baloch nationalists and elements of the Afghan Taliban resistant to Islamabad's influence.
'ISKP leadership figures, media commanders, foreign recruiters, and external facilitators have consistently surfaced near Pakistan's western border. This pattern does not suggest mere enforcement failure,' Hashimi wrote. 'It suggests either selective enforcement or a deliberate grey-zone approach, in which militant pressure is allowed to flow in directions perceived as strategically useful — against the Taliban and the Baloch simultaneously.'
Taliban's Public Accusation
The Afghan Taliban has itself publicly accused Pakistan of using ISKP to destabilise Afghanistan. Kabul's intensive counterterrorism operations against ISKP have, according to the report, compressed the group's operational space inside Afghanistan — adding another layer of tension to an already fraught bilateral relationship.
If the pattern documented in the report holds, the implications extend well beyond South Asia, potentially drawing in regional powers and complicating global counterterrorism frameworks.