Pakistan's ISKP gamble backfires as ISPP emerges as new threat
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
Pakistan's reported strategy of enlisting the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) — operating as the Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP) inside the country — to counter the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) appears to be producing dangerous unintended consequences. According to officials, the ISPP has abandoned any alignment with Pakistani security forces and is now expanding rapidly across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, emerging as a formidable new threat in its own right.
Intelligence Failure at the Core
An Intelligence Bureau official said Pakistani agencies were so focused on the TTP and BLA that they failed to track the ISPP's growth. 'The Pakistani intelligence agencies and the security forces gave too much priority to the TTP and BLA and in the bargain failed to realise that the ISPP and outfits such as the Ittehad Mujahideen-e-Pakistan (IMP) had been expanding,' the official said.
According to the official, there was not a single dedicated intelligence assessment or report highlighting the threat posed by the ISPP. The group reportedly capitalised on these blind spots to extend its footprint with little scrutiny from the state apparatus.
From 2015 Beginnings to a 2025 Surge
Although the ISPP began operations in 2015 in KP and Balochistan, the real acceleration came in 2025 — coinciding with the period of intense clashes between Pakistani security forces and both the TTP and BLA. Officials say it was during this window that the ISPP began actively recruiting disaffected TTP members, with reportedly more than 100 disgruntled operatives joining its ranks.
Notably, this is not the first time Pakistan's security establishment has been caught off-guard by a militant group it underestimated. The pattern of tactical miscalculation — engaging one threat while a secondary actor consolidates — has recurred across decades of Pakistan's counter-insurgency history.
Funding, Digital Reach, and Rising Attacks
Officials say the ISPP is backed by substantial financial resources, drawing on the transnational funding networks of its parent organisation, the Islamic State. The group has also leveraged digital publications — including its latest magazine, 'Invade' — to expand its international reach and recruitment base.
With these resources, the ISPP has stepped up the frequency of its attacks, with security personnel and state assets as its principal targets. Most large-scale incidents are currently concentrated in KP and Balochistan, though officials warn the group may seek to extend operations to other parts of the country. 'If that happens, Islamabad could face a far more complex security challenge that may prove increasingly difficult to contain,' one official warned.
The Tarangzai Murder: A Turning Point
Observers point to the 5 May murder of Deobandi cleric Sheikh Idrees Tarangzai in KP as a defining signal. Sheikh Tarangzai had reportedly been meeting with the ISPP's top leadership, urging them to cooperate with Pakistani security forces, and publicly praised the army and Field Marshal Asim Munir after those meetings. His killing, experts say, was a direct message from the ISPP that it would treat Islamabad as an enemy, not an ally.
Officials also note that several attacks previously attributed to the TTP in intelligence assessments were, in fact, carried out by the ISPP — a misattribution that further obscured the group's true operational scale.
What Comes Next
The ISPP's road map, according to officials, is clear: weaken the Pakistani state and inflict sustained damage on its security forces. Incidents of sectarian violence, suicide bombings, and targeted killings are on the rise. The group has also been expanding rapidly in Quetta, with officials describing its fighters as resilient, well-funded, and equipped with modern infrastructure and digital capabilities.
Whether Pakistan's establishment can recalibrate its intelligence priorities fast enough to contain the ISPP — while simultaneously managing the TTP and BLA — will be the defining security question for the country in the months ahead.