ISKP connectivity: Pakistan central to terror network, report finds

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ISKP connectivity: Pakistan central to terror network, report finds

Synopsis

A Stringer Asia report dismantles Pakistan's claim that ISKP is a foreign import, tracing the group's roots directly to a jihadist ecosystem Islamabad cultivated since the 1980s. With Balochistan emerging as a key operational zone and allegations against pro-state militia figures like Shafiq Mengal on record, the report frames Pakistan's 'state weakness' defence as a carefully maintained fiction.

Key Takeaways

A Stringer Asia report released on 19 July identifies Pakistan as central to ISKP's connectivity due to history and geography.
The report argues ISKP emerged from a jihadist ecosystem Pakistan cultivated since the Afghan war of the 1980s , not from Afghanistan.
ISKP has expanded in Balochistan by targeting Shia , Sufi , and Baloch nationalist communities.
The report alleges that jihadist groups maintain operational freedom in Balochistan even as peaceful activists face detention.
Shafiq Mengal is accused of leading death squads and operating private detention and torture facilities in Khuzdar , Balochistan.
The report concludes that Pakistan's security establishment helped create the strategic culture from which ISKP emerged.

The Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP) draws its greatest operational strength from connectivity, and Pakistan remains the linchpin of that network owing to deep historical and geographic ties, according to a report by Stringer Asia released on 19 July. The findings directly challenge Islamabad's long-standing position that ISKP is an externally introduced threat originating from Afghanistan.

Pakistan's Jihadist Ecosystem Under Scrutiny

The Stringer Asia report argues that ISKP did not enter Pakistan from outside but grew from within a jihadist infrastructure that the Pakistani state itself shaped. 'Pakistan has always attempted to present ISKP as a foreign infection entering from Afghanistan. This is convenient, but historically false. The organisation did not arrive in Pakistan from another planet. It emerged in part from the same jihadist ecosystem that the Pakistani state had cultivated, tolerated, or selectively fought since the Afghan war of the 1980s,' the report stated.

The report further criticised Islamabad's practice of distinguishing between 'useful' and 'hostile' jihadists — a policy it says created fertile ground for groups like ISKP to recruit, reorganise, and endure. 'A state cannot construct an entire strategic policy around armed religious proxies and then convincingly claim surprise when militants begin changing allegiance,' the report argued.

Selective Blindness and Compartmentalised Networks

According to the report, Pakistan's jihadist landscape has historically operated through compartmentalised organisations connected by facilitators, financiers, preachers, safe houses, and logistical intermediaries. The state, it contends, understood these networks well when it chose to exploit them — and developed a 'remarkable blindness' when pressed to dismantle them.

'Pakistan's jihadist landscape has long depended on compartmentalised organisations linked through facilitators, financiers, preachers, safe houses and logistical intermediaries. The state often understood these networks perfectly when it wished to use them. It became remarkably blind when asked to dismantle them,' the report noted.

ISKP's Expansion in Balochistan

The report highlights Balochistan as a key theatre of ISKP activity, where the organisation has expanded its footprint by targeting minority communities including Shia, Sufi, and Baloch nationalists. Notably, the report observes that ISKP's hostility toward secular Baloch movements conveniently aligns with the interests of Pakistan's security establishment, which has reportedly sought to weaken Baloch nationalism through religious militancy and state-protected armed groups.

The report points to a striking contradiction in Balochistan — a province saturated with military checkpoints and intelligence installations — where jihadist organisations reportedly maintain training facilities, weapons, communications infrastructure, and freedom of movement, while peaceful activists 'can barely organise a demonstration without being detained.'

'Militants somehow maintain training facilities, weapons, communications and movement in areas where peaceful activists can barely organise a demonstration without being detained. Pakistan explains this contradiction by invoking state weakness. Yet its weakness is curiously selective,' the report stated.

Shafiq Mengal and Pro-State Militia Allegations

The report also addresses allegations against Shafiq Mengal, accusing him of leading death squads, operating private detention and torture facilities, and participating in the counterinsurgency architecture built by the government in Khuzdar city of Balochistan. The report argues that claims about Mengal and the use of pro-state militias as intermediaries between extremist networks and the security establishment 'cannot be dismissed as propaganda.'

Broader Implications for Regional Security

The Stringer Asia report concludes that Pakistan's security establishment helped create the strategic culture from which ISKP emerged — one in which 'armed religious groups are cultivated, fragmented, renamed and redirected rather than eliminated.' The findings add to growing international scrutiny of Pakistan's dual approach to militancy, raising questions about accountability and the long-term trajectory of ISKP's reach across the region. How Islamabad responds to these documented contradictions will likely shape the next phase of counterterrorism engagement in South Asia.

Point of View

Not just the actors. Pakistan's 'state weakness' defence has long served as a diplomatic shield, but the selective nature of that weakness, capable of disappearing journalists yet unable to dismantle jihadist safe houses in heavily militarised Balochistan, is difficult to explain away. The ISKP question is inseparable from the broader question of whether Pakistan's security establishment has the political will to dismantle networks it once considered strategic assets. Until that changes, connectivity will remain ISKP's most durable weapon.
NationPress
20 Jul 2026

Frequently Asked Questions

Why does the report say Pakistan is central to ISKP's connectivity?
The Stringer Asia report argues that ISKP's strength lies in its connectivity, and Pakistan is central to it because the group emerged from a jihadist ecosystem that Pakistan cultivated, tolerated, or selectively fought since the Afghan war of the 1980s. The report says geography and this shared history make Pakistan structurally integral to ISKP's network.
What is ISKP and where is it active in Pakistan?
ISKP, or the Islamic State–Khorasan Province, is the South Asian affiliate of the Islamic State. According to the Stringer Asia report, it has significantly expanded its presence in Balochistan, where it targets Shia, Sufi, and Baloch nationalist communities.
Who is Shafiq Mengal and what are the allegations against him?
Shafiq Mengal is accused in the report of leading death squads, operating private detention and torture facilities, and participating in the counterinsurgency architecture in Khuzdar city, Balochistan. The report states these allegations cannot be dismissed as propaganda and suggests he served as an intermediary between extremist networks and Pakistan's security establishment.
How does the report explain the contradiction in Balochistan's security situation?
The report notes that despite Balochistan being heavily militarised with checkpoints and intelligence installations, jihadist groups reportedly maintain training facilities and freedom of movement there, while peaceful activists face detention. It argues this reflects selective, not genuine, state weakness.
What does the report conclude about Pakistan's role in creating ISKP?
The report concludes that Pakistan's security establishment helped create the strategic culture from which ISKP emerged, one where armed religious groups are cultivated, fragmented, renamed, and redirected rather than eliminated. It argues the state cannot credibly claim surprise at militant allegiance shifts when it built its strategy around armed religious proxies.
Nation Press
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