ISKP connectivity: Pakistan central to terror network, report finds
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
The Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISKP) draws its greatest operational strength from connectivity, and Pakistan remains the linchpin of that network owing to deep historical and geographic ties, according to a report by Stringer Asia released on 19 July. The findings directly challenge Islamabad's long-standing position that ISKP is an externally introduced threat originating from Afghanistan.
Pakistan's Jihadist Ecosystem Under Scrutiny
The Stringer Asia report argues that ISKP did not enter Pakistan from outside but grew from within a jihadist infrastructure that the Pakistani state itself shaped. 'Pakistan has always attempted to present ISKP as a foreign infection entering from Afghanistan. This is convenient, but historically false. The organisation did not arrive in Pakistan from another planet. It emerged in part from the same jihadist ecosystem that the Pakistani state had cultivated, tolerated, or selectively fought since the Afghan war of the 1980s,' the report stated.
The report further criticised Islamabad's practice of distinguishing between 'useful' and 'hostile' jihadists — a policy it says created fertile ground for groups like ISKP to recruit, reorganise, and endure. 'A state cannot construct an entire strategic policy around armed religious proxies and then convincingly claim surprise when militants begin changing allegiance,' the report argued.
Selective Blindness and Compartmentalised Networks
According to the report, Pakistan's jihadist landscape has historically operated through compartmentalised organisations connected by facilitators, financiers, preachers, safe houses, and logistical intermediaries. The state, it contends, understood these networks well when it chose to exploit them — and developed a 'remarkable blindness' when pressed to dismantle them.
'Pakistan's jihadist landscape has long depended on compartmentalised organisations linked through facilitators, financiers, preachers, safe houses and logistical intermediaries. The state often understood these networks perfectly when it wished to use them. It became remarkably blind when asked to dismantle them,' the report noted.
ISKP's Expansion in Balochistan
The report highlights Balochistan as a key theatre of ISKP activity, where the organisation has expanded its footprint by targeting minority communities including Shia, Sufi, and Baloch nationalists. Notably, the report observes that ISKP's hostility toward secular Baloch movements conveniently aligns with the interests of Pakistan's security establishment, which has reportedly sought to weaken Baloch nationalism through religious militancy and state-protected armed groups.
The report points to a striking contradiction in Balochistan — a province saturated with military checkpoints and intelligence installations — where jihadist organisations reportedly maintain training facilities, weapons, communications infrastructure, and freedom of movement, while peaceful activists 'can barely organise a demonstration without being detained.'
'Militants somehow maintain training facilities, weapons, communications and movement in areas where peaceful activists can barely organise a demonstration without being detained. Pakistan explains this contradiction by invoking state weakness. Yet its weakness is curiously selective,' the report stated.
Shafiq Mengal and Pro-State Militia Allegations
The report also addresses allegations against Shafiq Mengal, accusing him of leading death squads, operating private detention and torture facilities, and participating in the counterinsurgency architecture built by the government in Khuzdar city of Balochistan. The report argues that claims about Mengal and the use of pro-state militias as intermediaries between extremist networks and the security establishment 'cannot be dismissed as propaganda.'
Broader Implications for Regional Security
The Stringer Asia report concludes that Pakistan's security establishment helped create the strategic culture from which ISKP emerged — one in which 'armed religious groups are cultivated, fragmented, renamed and redirected rather than eliminated.' The findings add to growing international scrutiny of Pakistan's dual approach to militancy, raising questions about accountability and the long-term trajectory of ISKP's reach across the region. How Islamabad responds to these documented contradictions will likely shape the next phase of counterterrorism engagement in South Asia.