Militant violence across Pakistan surged by 27 per cent in May 2025, according to data from the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), exposing deepening cracks in the Pakistan Army's ability to contain armed insurgencies on its own soil. The spike comes at a moment when the military establishment, under Field Marshal Asim Munir, has consolidated near-total control over the country's domestic and foreign policy.

A Security Establishment Under Scrutiny

The Pakistani state now operates, by its own government's admission, as a 'hybrid regime' — a term publicly endorsed by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, who argued that such an arrangement was necessary for Pakistan to navigate its economic and governance crises. Asif described the model as 'not an ideal democratic government' but claimed it was 'doing wonders' — a claim critics argue is unsupported by evidence on the ground.

Since Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif assumed office, the civilian government has largely functioned as a ratifier of military decisions rather than an independent governing authority. Analysts note that this arrangement has blurred accountability, particularly when security policy fails.

Two Decades of Operations, No Resolution

Pakistan has conducted 14 military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) alone over the past two decades to suppress armed militant groups, in addition to two nationwide campaigns — Operation Radd-ul Fassad in 2014 and Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in 2024. None of these operations has durably neutralised the threat, according to assessments of the security situation.

The operations have also generated significant civilian costs. In August 2025, a military campaign in the northwestern Bajaur district displaced thousands of residents. In January 2025, reports emerged of a planned operation in KP's Tirah Valley, which triggered a mass exodus of more than 70,000 people — mostly women and children — before the government denied any such operation was imminent. The deep distrust between local communities and the security establishment meant official assurances went largely unheeded.

Notably, the very demand for yet another military operation contradicts earlier claims by the Army that previous campaigns had been successful.

Externalising the Crisis: The Afghanistan Dimension

Rather than address internal security failures directly, Defence Minister Asif has consistently sought to attribute the rise in attacks to the Afghan Taliban regime, accusing it of harbouring and enabling the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and acting as a proxy for anti-Pakistan forces. Critics argue this framing is a deliberate deflection from the Army's inability to suppress armed Baloch nationalist groups in Balochistan and religious extremists in KP.

Pakistan subsequently carried out military strikes against Afghanistan — a move that analysts say carries little strategic logic against a weakly governed state still consolidating authority, but serves to redirect domestic criticism. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's Deputy Spokesperson Hamdullah Fitrat stated that the TTP issue is 'an internal matter of Pakistan' and that while Kabul is willing to ensure Afghan soil is not used against any country, 'some of Pakistan's demands are unrealistic and cannot be implemented by Afghanistan.'

Prime Minister Sharif, speaking in Quetta, warned that Pakistan's military action would continue 'with full resolve to defend lives and property of innocent citizens against Afghan Taliban-based terrorist proxies.'

Economic Failures Compound the Security Picture

The hybrid model's record on the economic front is equally contested. Despite the formation of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) — with the Army at its core — to attract foreign direct investment, investor interest in Pakistan has reportedly declined rather than grown. The country continues to seek international bailouts and financial assistance, undermining the government's narrative of a stabilising establishment-led recovery.

What Comes Next

The Pakistan-Afghanistan standoff has reached what observers describe as an impasse: Kabul has signalled willingness to cooperate within limits it can realistically enforce, while Islamabad appears committed to a posture of military pressure and coercion. Until Pakistan's security establishment turns its focus inward — addressing the political and socioeconomic drivers of militancy rather than externalising blame — the cycle of violence, displacement, and institutional distrust is unlikely to break.