Operation Sindoor forces Lashkar, Jaish to overhaul recruitment and funding
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
India's military strike on terror infrastructure in Pakistan — Operation Sindoor — has compelled Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) to fundamentally restructure their recruitment pipelines, funding mechanisms, and operational doctrine, according to intelligence officials. The twin Pakistan-based terror outfits, rattled by the strikes and mounting international financial pressure, have pivoted to a low-cost, high-deniability model that poses a fresh challenge for Indian counterterrorism agencies.
The HAYI Recruitment Model: Crowdsourcing Violence
The most consequential tactical shift has been the adoption of the Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) recruitment model, which Lashkar-e-Taiba became the first to adopt after Operation Sindoor. According to an Intelligence Bureau official, this model has been in active use since March–April 2026.
'This is not a conventional form of recruitment. The idea is to move past the traditional model of recruitment so that the radar on the recruits is hardly anything. Moreover, this is also a cost-effective form of recruitment,' the official said.
Under the HAYI framework, handlers forgo the traditional method of deploying scouts on the ground. Instead, they use everyday digital messaging platforms to identify and rope in recruits — predominantly non-ideological individuals motivated by modest financial payments. The operating motto, described by officials as 'violence as a service', directs these recruits toward acts such as targeted stabbings and vandalism in public spaces, rather than large-scale armed attacks.
Plausible Deniability Through Layered Subcontracting
Officials say the HAYI model is deliberately engineered to insulate state-sponsored terror groups from legal and intelligence accountability. 'There is plausible deniability because several intermediaries operate between state-sponsored terror groups such as Jaish and Lashkar and the perpetrators on the ground. When a recruit is apprehended, tracing the operation back to the state-sponsored terror outfit becomes difficult,' one official noted.
Intelligence inputs suggest that one Shehzad Bhatti followed the HAYI model. Officials further indicated that Jammu and Kashmir has been specifically identified by LeT and JeM as a primary theatre for intensive HAYI deployment. With the smuggling of military-grade weapons and cross-border infiltration made significantly harder by heightened security, the model substitutes knives and bladed weapons for conventional arms.
'The attacks would focus more on soft yet high-visibility targets. In addition to this, the recruits have also been instructed to ramp up information warfare,' the official added. The integration of artificial intelligence tools by terror groups is also reportedly compounding the challenge for security agencies.
Funding Squeeze: From Centralised Reserves to Digital Wallets
Beyond recruitment, both outfits face a deepening funding crisis — a direct consequence of India's counterterrorism offensive and sustained international pressure through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
The HAYI model's near-zero operational cost structure partly addresses this problem. Recruits require minimal preparation, carry out reconnaissance-free attacks, and are paid modest sums, drastically reducing the outfits' expenditure and their exposure to international terror-financing watchdogs.
Notably, the broader jihadi financing ecosystem has been migrating from centralised banking reserves to decentralised digital wallets. The Islamic State has been sustaining operations through local extortion, kidnapping, illicit smuggling, and cryptocurrency transfers. Al-Qaeda has increasingly leaned on its African affiliates for revenue generation.
The Lashkar, according to officials, is now heavily dependent on its welfare front Khidmat-e-Khalq — set up to support its political wing, the Pakistan Markazi Muslim League (PMML) — with funds raised under a legal veneer reportedly being siphoned to terror operations. Meanwhile, the Jaish-e-Mohammed has been actively pursuing digital crowdfunding, utilising more than 250 Pakistani digital wallets including EasyPaisa and SadaPay. It has also reportedly rebranded itself as Al-Murabitun to deflect international scrutiny.
Lashkar's Financial Decline: From $100 Million to $40–50 Million
The financial erosion of these outfits has been stark. In 2015, the Lashkar-e-Taiba ranked seventh among the world's richest terror organisations, with an annual turnover of $100 million. By 2022–23, that figure had fallen to $75 million. Current intelligence estimates place the annual turnover in the range of $40–50 million — less than half of its peak a decade ago.
This financial contraction, combined with the operational disruption caused by Operation Sindoor, has forced both outfits to reinvent their strategic calculus. Officials warn, however, that the HAYI model represents a genuinely novel threat vector — one that is harder to pre-empt, easier to disown, and cheaper to execute than any previous tactic these groups have deployed. India's counterterrorism apparatus is expected to adapt its doctrine accordingly in the months ahead.