Operation Sindoor: Inside Pakistan's fake victory circus and terror group rifts
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
Following Operation Sindoor, in which Indian armed forces struck terror infrastructure deep inside Pakistan in retaliation for the Pahalgam terror attack, Islamabad launched a coordinated disinformation campaign projecting a Pakistani victory — even as the strike left both Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) deeply fractured, according to Indian intelligence officials.
The Manufactured Victory Narrative
According to officials, events were strategically planned across Pakistan to project a false image of triumph. Pakistan's Army chief reportedly instructed the Shehbaz Sharif government to release ₹500 crore, which was then distributed evenly among federal agencies, business groups, and religious organisations — all of whom were directed to organise large-scale rallies. The programme, mandated by the Pakistan Army, was titled 'Ashra-e-Tashakur Fateh-E-Muneeb' — meaning ten days of gratitude for a decisive victory. Social media handles run by Pakistani operatives also reportedly worked overtime to amplify the false narrative.
In a further bid to consolidate his image, Army chief Asim Munir allegedly pressured the Sharif government to confer upon him the rank of Field Marshal, according to the officials.
What Operation Sindoor Actually Struck
The scale of damage inflicted by the Indian operation tells a starkly different story. The Jaish-e-Mohammad lost its Bahawalpur headquarters — its primary base of operations — in the strikes. JeM chief Masood Azhar reportedly lost most of his family members along with several cadres. The Muridke camp, the Lashkar-e-Tayiba's primary training facility, was also destroyed during the operation. Officials note that while encounters and targeted killings of terrorists have occurred on Indian soil before, neither group had ever been struck so hard, and so deep inside Pakistani territory.
Cracks Within Terror Groups
An Intelligence Bureau official told NationPress that while the ten-day rallies proceeded on a grand scale, something far more serious was unfolding within the ranks of both terror outfits. Both Hafiz Saeed of the LeT and Masood Azhar of the JeM had reportedly begun questioning the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), demanding to know what had happened to the guarantees of protection they had been assured. These groups, the official explained, have historically operated freely only because of the funding and protection extended by the Army and the ISI.
The official added that many rank-and-file cadres had also started questioning their own leadership, deepening the internal disarray. "The impression that the Pakistan establishment sought to create worked among a few people, but clearly their proxies were not impressed. They knew what they had lost and the fact that the Army could not even defend them is what left them completely disgruntled," the official said.
Army's Desperation Exposed Its Own Contradictions
Analysts and Pakistan watchers point out that the Army's insistence on having JeM and LeT cadres visibly participate in the victory rallies inadvertently backfired. By doing so, the establishment publicly showcased that globally banned terror groups — both the Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Tayiba are internationally designated terrorist organisations — remain embedded within the Pakistani state's ecosystem. "It was nothing but desperation on part of the Army. It had to indulge in this circus and claim a false victory. In reality, the Pakistan Army and its chief were the hardest hit," Pakistan watchers noted.
Long Road to Rebuilding
Officials say the combination of unprecedented physical losses, broken trust between the terror groups and their military patrons, and internal dissent among cadres explains why both the JeM and LeT are taking significantly longer than expected to rebuild their operational capacity. This comes amid heightened international scrutiny of Pakistan's links to these organisations. The rifts exposed by Operation Sindoor may have lasting consequences for the Army's ability to deploy these groups as strategic proxies going forward.