Operation Vijay: The Liberation of Goa and the Conclusion of Portuguese Domination

New Delhi, Dec 19 (NationPress) Goan history records over 40 uprisings against Portuguese governance. In 1946, 14 Goan leaders faced deportation to Portugal and Angola. Between February 1954 and May 1955, approximately 3,000 Goans were arrested, with more than 1,000 imprisoned, many without trial, along with countless others who were detained and brutalized for merely possessing images of Mahatma Gandhi or Jawaharlal Nehru.

H.C. Denis, Chairman of the Goan League in England, expressed, “This is no small evidence of our determination to reunite with India” in a correspondence to the Manchester Guardian.

In a bid for behind-the-scenes diplomacy between India and Portugal, Belthi Shah Gilani, head of India’s UN delegation and a close associate of then Prime Minister Nehru, traveled to Lisbon in October 1955 to negotiate the situation regarding Goa.

In November 1955, during a visit from Soviet leaders to Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru mentioned the Soviet veto that prevented 18 nations from joining the UN.

As a gesture of goodwill, Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev approved most entries, except for Mongolia and Japan. Portugal, backed by India, gained UN membership, marking a change from India's previous stance.

However, shortly after joining on December 22, 1955, Portugal turned to the International Court of Justice, claiming that India obstructed its forces from accessing Dadra and Nagar Haveli.

By mid-1961, frustrated with Prime Minister Salazar's stubbornness, Nehru lost his temper. By late August, Indian military officials were made aware that an assault on Portuguese territories was a real possibility. Lt. General J.N. Chaudhari crafted a deployment plan for ground, air, and naval forces after evaluating the Goa border.

In November 1961, after Indian vessels were fired upon near Anjadiv Island, the urgency for military response escalated. Initially, the government’s focus seemed solely on Anjadiv Island, as indicated by a warning order dated November 29.

This directive stated: "In response to recent Portuguese aggression against Indian nationals, the government plans to undertake specific actions in the Anjadiv Island area. Portuguese retaliation may necessitate armed action against their territories in India."

However, a comprehensive analysis by the armed forces indicated that confining operations to Anjadiv would provide little strategic advantage. Thus, the strategy was broadened to encompass all Portuguese territories in India.

In early December 1961, mere weeks ahead of India’s military intervention in Goa, Portugal suggested an international mission to investigate border incidents. India dismissed this offer, reaffirming its wish for Portugal to vacate its colonies. The operation was initially scheduled for December 16 but was postponed to December 18, likely due to diplomatic maneuvers at the UN and Nehru’s inclination towards a peaceful settlement.

From December 4 to 11, Indian officials reported various border infringements by Portuguese patrols, including gunfire and house searches. Protest notes were dispatched, while Portugal countered with accusations against India of similar transgressions, including overflights and assaults on a Goan village.

Despite ongoing tensions, Portugal refrained from retaliation but welcomed international observers to evaluate the circumstances. On December 11, Nehru informed the Rajya Sabha that India's patience had been exhausted due to persistent Portuguese provocations.

On December 12, Governor General Vassalo e Silva mandated the evacuation of European women and children of Portuguese officials and military personnel, which was executed via air and sea in the following days.

Just as hope seemed lost, Salazar transmitted a dramatic telegram on December 14, 1961, to the Governor General on the eve of the Indian military's assault, demanding a total sacrifice, indicating that his soldiers must either triumph or perish defending the realm.

Salazar also instructed him to destroy Goa before yielding it to the Indian Army, but the Governor General was unable to comply with these orders, leading to severe repercussions from the merciless dictator back home.

Operation Vijay commenced before Prime Minister Nehru reconsidered halting it, with the Indian army advancing into Goa on December 18 from the southern region. Major General K.P. Candeth, GOC of the 17th infantry division, oversaw the operations against Goa.

Opposition from the Portuguese was minimal, with their forces surrendering without violence. On the eastern and northern fronts, there was scant resistance, with Portuguese troops firing a few shots prior to retreating.

The operation order dated December 11 instructed the 17th Infantry Division and allied forces to rapidly push into Goa to seize Panjim and Marmugao using a multi-faceted strategy: advances from the east and north, alongside a diversionary entry from the south.

A small contingent entered Goa from the south at 6 a.m. on December 18, facing little resistance at Ardifond before moving towards Margao on the morning of December 19, capturing the southern half of Goa without sustaining any casualties.

On the eastern and northern fronts, resistance was restricted to sporadic gunfire as Portuguese forces employed delaying tactics, such as demolishing bridges, laying mines, and establishing roadblocks.

The Portuguese strategy aimed to delay Indian forces for at least eight days to secure international intervention through a UN resolution. Salazar's directives stressed a no-surrender policy, envisioning either conquest or complete ruin.

Indian forces, aware of these intentions, aimed to conclude the operation within three days. They deployed superior strength and efficient engineering units to simultaneously repair bridges, ensuring rapid advancement.

Upon realizing the futility of resistance, the Portuguese refrained from major confrontations, instead concentrating on sabotaging infrastructure.

This lack of determined opposition enabled Indian forces to liberate Goa in just one and a half days, far quicker than projected.

The resistance from Portuguese forces in Daman and Diu was significantly greater compared to Goa. In Daman, troops adhered to orders to "fight to the last man and last round," resulting in intense clashes. Communication with Goa was severed on the morning of December 18, leaving Daman and Diu without further directives from Goa or Lisbon.

The confrontation in Daman resulted in 4 Indian fatalities and 14 injuries, while Portuguese casualties included 10 deaths and 2 injuries.

In Diu, resistance was similarly fierce, leading to 8 Indian deaths and 17 injuries. In Goa, where opposition was weaker, Indian casualties totaled 3 killed and 4 injured, while Portuguese forces experienced 13 deaths and 10 injuries.

By the evening of December 19, 1961, all operations concluded, and the Portuguese Governor General, Manuel António Vassalo e Silva, signed the unconditional surrender documents in Vasco da Gama, Goa.

(The writer is an author and columnist. Her latest book is Blood In The Sea: The Dark History of Hindu Oppression In Goa)