China leads HALEU nuclear fuel race as US scrambles for supply
Synopsis
A US congressional watchdog has confirmed what energy strategists have long feared: China and Russia are the only countries producing advanced nuclear fuel at scale, while America has no commercial HALEU capacity and faces a widening supply gap that could outlast its reactor ambitions. With demand projected to hit 500 metric tonnes annually by 2050 and domestic alternatives years away, the fuel race is quietly becoming one of the sharpest edges of US-China strategic competition.
Key Takeaways
Only Russia and China currently produce HALEU — the fuel required by most advanced nuclear reactors — at commercial scale, according to a GAO report.
The US Department of Energy expects just 23.4 metric tonnes of HALEU by end of 2030 , against projected annual demand of 50 metric tonnes by 2035 and 500 metric tonnes by 2050 .
TerraPower , X-energy , and Kairos Power are among more than a dozen developers that have requested HALEU for demonstration projects into the 2030s .
TerraPower signed a separate enrichment deal with a South African firm, citing doubts over US government supply timelines.
Washington has committed $1.8 billion to develop domestic HALEU capacity, but the GAO found no economic analysis confirming this would create sustainable production.
The National Nuclear Security Administration estimates restoring defence fuel supplies could cost $140 billion through 2105 ; existing inventories are expected to last only until the early 2040s .
China is one of only two countries capable of producing high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) at commercial scale, giving Beijing a potentially decisive strategic edge as the United States accelerates its push to deploy advanced nuclear reactors, according to a report released this week by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO). The findings expose a significant supply vulnerability at the heart of Washington's energy and national-security strategy.
The HALEU Supply Gap
The GAO confirmed that only Russia and China currently possess infrastructure capable of producing HALEU at scale — the specialised fuel required by most next-generation reactor designs under development in the West. The United States has no commercial-scale HALEU enrichment capacity of its own, and the volume available through government programmes is expected to fall short of demand from reactor developers in the years ahead.
The US Department of Energy projects it will have approximately 21.2 metric tonnes of HALEU available by the end of 2028 and 23.4 metric tonnes by end of 2030. Against that, the department's own 2024 assessment estimated annual US commercial demand reaching 50 metric tonnes by 2035 and climbing to roughly 500 metric tonnes by 2050 — a gap that officials told the watchdog is likely to materialise before domestic commercial production comes online.
Advanced Reactor Developers Feel the Pressure
More than a dozen advanced-reactor developers — including TerraPower, X-energy, and Kairos Power — have formally requested HALEU from the Department of Energy for demonstration projects extending into the 2030s. The shortfall's precise scale remains uncertain, the GAO noted, because several proposed reactors face ambitious development and licensing timelines that may shift.
TerraPower has separately signed an enrichment agreement with a South African company, citing doubts that the Energy Department could deliver sufficient HALEU within the timeframe required for its first reactor core — a signal that industry confidence in the government supply chain is already under strain.
Western Alternatives Still Years Away
European enrichment consortium Urenco expects to produce around 10 metric tonnes of HALEU annually at a facility in Britain, but that supply is not anticipated until the early 2030s, according to the GAO report. Washington has awarded $1.8 billion to two companies to develop domestic HALEU capacity, and a further $900 million to one company to expand production of conventional low-enriched uranium for the existing reactor fleet.
Despite these investments, the GAO found that the Department of Energy had not documented an economic analysis demonstrating whether its measures would be sufficient to establish commercially sustainable domestic production. The watchdog recommended that the department complete such an analysis, finalise a congressionally mandated report on HALEU availability, and strengthen programme-management documentation.
Broader National Security Implications
The report's findings extend beyond commercial energy. The United States has relied since 2013 on diminishing uranium inventories to meet national-security requirements, owing to a lack of fully domestic enrichment capability using US-origin technology. The National Nuclear Security Administration estimates that restoring long-term fuel supplies for defence missions could cost approximately $140 billion through 2105, with existing inventories expected to remain adequate only until the early 2040s.
China's existing infrastructure could grow more strategically significant if advanced reactors are deployed faster than Western nations can establish alternative fuel sources. However, US national-security restrictions and broader geopolitical tensions make Chinese-supplied material an effectively unavailable option for Washington. The Department of Energy said it plans to issue the HALEU availability report by November and complete its economic analysis by June 2027. How quickly domestic and allied supply chains can scale up will shape the pace — and the geopolitics — of the advanced nuclear transition.
Point of View
But the absence of a documented economic viability analysis — flagged explicitly by the watchdog — suggests the government is investing without a credible roadmap. Meanwhile, the irony is stark: Washington's push to reduce dependence on Russian nuclear material has revealed an equal dependence gap that China, not Russia, may be best positioned to exploit. The real risk is not that the US buys Chinese HALEU — geopolitics makes that impossible — but that the supply shortfall delays or derails the advanced reactor programme entirely, ceding the next generation of nuclear technology to countries that solved the fuel problem first.
NationPress
22 Aug 2026
Frequently Asked Questions
What is HALEU and why does it matter for advanced nuclear reactors?
HALEU, or high-assay low-enriched uranium, is a specialised nuclear fuel enriched to between 5% and 20% uranium-235, required by most next-generation reactor designs currently under development. Without a reliable HALEU supply, advanced reactor projects cannot move from demonstration to commercial operation.
Why does the US face a HALEU shortage?
The United States currently has no commercial-scale HALEU enrichment capacity, and the volume available through government programmes is expected to fall short of demand from reactor developers in the coming years, according to the GAO. The Department of Energy projects only 23.4 metric tonnes available by end of 2030, against demand that could reach 50 metric tonnes annually by 2035.
Which countries can produce HALEU at scale?
Only Russia and China currently have the infrastructure to produce HALEU at commercial scale, the GAO confirmed. European consortium Urenco is developing capacity at a British facility but does not expect output until the early 2030s.
What has the US government done to address the HALEU gap?
Washington has awarded $1.8 billion to two companies to develop domestic HALEU enrichment capacity and $900 million to expand conventional low-enriched uranium production. However, the GAO found the Department of Energy had not completed an economic analysis confirming these investments would create commercially sustainable production.
What are the national security implications of the HALEU shortage?
Beyond commercial energy, the US has relied since 2013 on shrinking uranium inventories for national-security needs due to a lack of fully domestic enrichment capability. The National Nuclear Security Administration estimates restoring long-term defence fuel supplies could cost approximately $140 billion through 2105, with current stockpiles expected to last only until the early 2040s.
