China's critical minerals weaponisation: Why countries are growing wary
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
As nations, including India, accelerate efforts to secure alternative rare earth sources and reduce their dependence on China, a growing number of governments are becoming wary of Beijing's deliberate weaponisation of critical minerals, according to a report by World Politics Review. The findings underscore a structural vulnerability that runs through the global supply chains of advanced technology, defence equipment, and clean energy hardware.
China's Stranglehold on Rare Earth Processing
China controls roughly 90 per cent of global processing and refining capacity for rare earths — a dominance that gives it considerable leverage over the United States and its allies. Last year, Beijing demonstrated the reach of that leverage when it rolled out rare earth export controls in direct response to US President Donald Trump's tariff escalation. The move was widely read as a calibrated signal, not merely an economic countermeasure.
The World Politics Review report cautioned that 'The United States and Europe have been caught flat-footed in recent years by China's actual and threatened use of export controls over critical minerals and related magnets.' Some Western officials have gone further, reportedly accusing Beijing of a 'decades-long scheme to place a boot on the neck of the global economy' — a characterisation that reflects the depth of alarm within allied capitals.
China's Ambitions Move Beyond Domestic Dominance
Beijing's strategy has shifted in scale and ambition. Its objective, analysts now argue, is no longer confined to dominating rare earth production within its own borders; it is increasingly aimed at controlling the global industry by determining which countries receive the technology, skilled technicians, and market access needed to become credible competitors. This represents a qualitative escalation from supply-side control to a broader gatekeeper role.
Jack Lifton, Co-Chair of the Critical Minerals Institute (CMI), highlighted in a recent article in Investor News that China's approach to Malaysia and Indonesia offers clear evidence of this new policy direction.
The Malaysia and Indonesia Playbook
Malaysia has prohibited exports of its unprocessed rare earth material, prioritising domestic value addition while simultaneously welcoming both Chinese and non-Chinese investment. Its non-Chinese industrial base has grown more formidable as a result. However, according to Lifton, China's goal is not to see Malaysia emerge as a Western or Japanese-sponsored rival — rather, Beijing wants Malaysia to become a 'multi-aligned processing centre in which China remains an indispensable participant.'
Indonesia presents a different picture. The country is keen to develop its rare earth resources, but publicly available evidence of a major, dedicated Chinese rare earth separation or magnet project there remains limited. Notably, in February 2026, Indonesia announced it had identified eight prospective blocks containing rare earths and other strategic minerals, signalling its intent to become a significant player in the sector.
What This Means for India and Its Allies
For India — which has its own substantial rare earth deposits but limited processing capacity — the global race to build alternatives to Chinese supply chains presents both an opportunity and an urgency. This comes amid broader efforts by the Quad, the G7, and bilateral supply-chain partnerships to establish China-independent rare earth corridors. The scale of China's processing dominance means that even ambitious diversification timelines are measured in years, if not decades.
How quickly allied nations can operationalise alternative supply chains will define the terms of technological competition well into the next decade.