Hong Kong, April 4 (NationPress) Following Iran's recent strike that successfully targeted and destroyed the US AN/TPY-2 radar located in Jordan—an asset deployed without the safeguards of a "well-networked system-of-systems architecture"—there are concerns regarding the vulnerability of China's fragmented intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the South China Sea (SCS), according to a report released on Saturday.

“The annihilation of the AN/TPY-2 radar highlights the challenges China encounters in establishing information dominance in the South China Sea (SCS), even with substantial investments made in ISR capabilities,” the report from the Hong Kong-based English publication 'Asia Times' elaborated.

“While China has developed a multi-layered, overlapping ISR framework in the SCS, it still lacks a comprehensive well-networked system-of-systems architecture. This shortfall presents a strategic opening for Southeast Asian claimant states, the United States, and its allies to contest China's ‘informationized warfare’ during any potential conflict in the SCS,” it continued.

The report pointed out that the geographical characteristics of the SCS, combined with the basic principles of radar functionality, restrict China's ISR capabilities.

A crucial factor in Iran's successful assault on such an advanced radar system is attributed to its isolation from broader defensive networks that could have shielded it from threats.

The report emphasized that radar systems, which emit electromagnetic radiation, are inherently susceptible to counterattacks and necessitate a defensive umbrella comprising airborne, naval, or ground-based systems to protect against incoming threats.

“The AN/TPY-2 was stationed at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, positioned just over 800 km from Iran—well within its operational radar range—but failed to intercept the attack. While specifics of the Iranian strike remain undisclosed, integrating with airborne or ground-based radar systems could have considerably enhanced its defensive capacity,” it stated.

“Thus, establishing a well-networked system-of-systems architecture is essential for attaining information superiority; no single system can operate at its full potential in isolation, thereby leaving exploitable gaps that only seamless integration can effectively address,” the report asserted.

The findings underscored that China has yet to synchronize its airborne, naval, and ground-based radar systems into a real-time operational network.

“Despite having developed a multi-layered, overlapping ISR framework, the lack of a cohesive system-of-systems architecture means these systems operate independently, offering limited mutual support,” it noted.

This vulnerability could provide an opportunity for Southeast Asian claimant states, the United States, and its allies to counter China's “informationized warfare” and its electronic warfare capabilities, thereby hindering Beijing's aspirations for information dominance in any SCS conflict.