Indian intelligence agencies have warned that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is actively pushing a joint operational revival of Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr in Jammu and Kashmir, according to officials familiar with recent intercepts. The move, reportedly accelerated after Operation Sindoor weakened the ISI's primary proxies, is designed to give Pakistan a 'homegrown' deniability cover for future strikes in the Valley.

The Hizbul-Al-Badr Convergence

Al-Badr, originally formed to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, had largely faded from active operations over the years. Its revival effort suffered a fresh blow when its top commander in Pakistan, Hamza Burhan, was killed in recent months. Despite the setback, an Intelligence Bureau official cautioned that writing off the outfit would be premature.

'Al-Badr realises that it cannot operate on its own as it has no required strength and traction. However, with the Hizbul Mujahideen by its side, it can make a comeback in the Valley,' the official said, according to reports.

The convergence of the two groups was publicly visible as recently as last week, when leaders and cadres of both outfits — along with ISI officials — attended Hamza Burhan's funeral. Zameen Bakht, chief of Al-Badr, and Syed Salahuddin, chief of Hizbul Mujahideen, were both present at the funeral, according to officials.

Why the ISI Prefers 'Homegrown' Outfits

Both Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr draw their cadres largely from operatives who are originally from Jammu and Kashmir — many of whom crossed over to Pakistan years ago, reportedly under the pretext of pursuing education, as part of what officials describe as an ISI strategy to train and reinfiltrate them into the Valley.

For the ISI, a combined Hizbul-Al-Badr operation offers a critical strategic advantage: deniability. 'In the scheme of things, a combination of the Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr works perfectly for the ISI,' an official said. 'Both are well-versed with the Valley, and the fact that they would operate with local operatives also makes operations homegrown.'

Agencies note that homegrown terror activity is considered far more dangerous than operations mounted by Jaish-e-Mohammed or Lashkar-e-Taiba, precisely because of the local knowledge and reduced foreign attribution.

Poaching from Jaish and Lashkar

Both groups are also actively recruiting from within the ranks of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which were the hardest hit during Operation Sindoor. Officials say recent inputs indicate that disgruntled cadres from both outfits have been in contact with Hizbul Mujahideen's leadership.

Notably, this cross-recruitment carries its own risks. Officials acknowledge that poaching from rival outfits could eventually spark a turf war — a risk the ISI is reportedly willing to absorb in the short term, given the priority placed on resuming operations in Jammu and Kashmir.

Propaganda and Radicalisation Drive

Before his death, Hamza Burhan was reportedly spearheading a major propaganda campaign for the two outfits, described as a 'poster war' targeting youth radicalisation and mobilisation. The planned campaign was to centre on the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019 and what the groups characterise as injustice meted out to Kashmir's youth as a result of that decision.

Officials say the propaganda strategy is integral to the revival plan, with both groups seeking to rebuild local support before escalating to operational activity. With Hizbul Mujahideen retaining residual traction in parts of the Valley — even if not at the scale seen during the era of Burhan Wani — agencies regard the threat as credible and evolving.