AIMIM president Asaduddin Owaisi on Wednesday, June 24, 2026, sharply questioned the Narendra Modi government over what he called a one-sided approach to normalising ties with China, alleging that India is making concessions without receiving anything in return from Beijing.

Context

Owaisi, in a post on X, argued that the central issue in India-China relations is Beijing's demand that New Delhi set aside the border dispute as a precondition for bilateral normalcy. He wrote: 'The issue is not this, the issue is that China wants India to keep the border issue aside in pursuit of normalcy in bilateral ties. But Beijing is unwilling to do anything in return.'

The Hyderabad MP pointed to two specific grievances: China's continued close operational military support to Pakistan, and its refusal to share hydrological data on the Brahmaputra river with India. He also flagged that India is reportedly considering an 'early harvest' agreement on the border issue — a diplomatic term for resolving less contentious areas first — without a clear public rationale from the government.

Policy Backdrop

The India-China boundary dispute escalated sharply after the June 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which resulted in casualties on both sides and triggered a prolonged freeze in bilateral ties. Since then, the two countries have held multiple rounds of corps commander-level talks aimed at disengagement along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with phased pullbacks in certain friction points.

India and China had a standing arrangement, formalised in 2002, for Beijing to share hydrological data on the Brahmaputra during the flood season — data critical for downstream flood warnings in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. That data-sharing arrangement has been affected by bilateral tensions in the post-2020 period. Meanwhile, China has deepened its military and strategic partnership with Pakistan, including nuclear and conventional defence cooperation, a dynamic that Indian strategic analysts have long flagged as a two-front challenge.

The concept of an 'early harvest' on the border — resolving mutually agreeable LAC sectors while leaving harder disputes for later — has been discussed in Indian policy circles as a way to rebuild momentum in the relationship. Owaisi's post challenges the government to publicly justify why India would offer such concessions without equivalent gestures from China.

Stakeholders and Impact

The Indian Armed Forces, particularly formations deployed along the LAC in Ladakh, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, and Arunachal Pradesh, are the most direct stakeholders in any border arrangement. Border communities in these states, as well as downstream populations in Assam who depend on Brahmaputra flood-warning data, also have a material stake in the bilateral relationship.

Opposition parties, including AIMIM and the Indian National Congress, have repeatedly pressed the government for greater transparency on the terms of any LAC disengagement or diplomatic accommodation with China. Owaisi's post reflects a broader demand from opposition quarters for the Modi government to explain the strategic logic of its China engagement on the floor of Parliament and in public discourse.

What's Next

Attention will now turn to whether the Modi government responds to the opposition's demand for an explanation, and whether any 'early harvest' framework on the LAC is formally announced or discussed at upcoming multilateral forums such as the SCO or BRICS summits. The resumption of Brahmaputra hydrological data sharing will also serve as a key indicator of whether India-China ties are genuinely moving toward normalcy or whether the concessions Owaisi describes remain unreciprocated. Parliamentary sessions will likely become the arena where the government is pressed hardest to articulate its China policy in detail.