American Enterprise Institute senior fellow Michael Rubin has argued that Pakistan stands to gain little lasting benefit from its current proximity to the Trump administration, warning that Washington has a long history of using Islamabad as a strategic tool and then abandoning it. Writing in The Sunday Guardian, Rubin contended that US President Donald Trump's decision to honour Pakistan Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir — rather than hold the country accountable for sheltering Osama bin Laden, sponsoring the Taliban, and its prolonged double-dealing with the United States — has come at a significant strategic cost.

A Quarter-Century Partnership Shredded

"In doing so, President Trump has systematically shredded a quarter century effort to build a US-India partnership," Rubin wrote. He described Munir as an "unapologetic terror apologist" with, in his words, both American and Indian blood on his hands. The elevation of Munir, Rubin argued, sends a damaging signal to New Delhi at a time when the US-India strategic relationship had been painstakingly constructed over 25 years.

The West Asia Mediation Gambit

Trump reportedly turned to Pakistan to mediate between the US and Iran on the West Asia conflict, effectively placing Islamabad on what Rubin described as a "pedestal." Rubin noted the sharp contrast with Trump's first term, when the President had publicly criticised Pakistan's "lies and deceit" — a posture that has now shifted to describing Pakistanis as "brilliant people." Critics argue this reversal reflects transactional short-termism rather than a coherent South Asia strategy.

Pakistan's Strategic Miscalculations

Rubin suggested that Pakistani authorities may believe Trump will sell them advanced technology to offset India's military advantage, or that Munir hopes to leverage a US mediation opening on Kashmir. However, Rubin cautioned that such calculations ignore the historically misaligned objectives of the two countries. "America sought to stop if not roll back Soviet expansion; Pakistan was more obsessed with India," he wrote. He noted that Pakistani officials had a "unique ability not only to start every single war with India, but to convince themselves and Pakistani society after they lost that Pakistan was the victim from the start."

A History of US Sanctions and Strategic Abandonment

Rubin characterised Pakistan as "a criminal state" and pointed to a recurring pattern: the United States has sanctioned Pakistan repeatedly over the past 50 years, even while nominally treating it as an ally. After Pakistan detonated its nuclear weapon in 1998, Glenn Amendment sanctions came into force and remained until 2001, when President George W. Bush waived them to secure Pakistani cooperation on Afghanistan. Neither President Lyndon Johnson nor Richard Nixon fully accepted the Pakistani narrative, and Washington never seriously considered mobilising against India on Pakistan's behalf — even under National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, whose animosity toward Prime Minister Indira Gandhi Rubin described as "unhinged."

Pakistan's Leverage May Already Be Gone

With US forces no longer stationed in Afghanistan, Rubin argued, the strategic rationale that previously compelled Washington to court Islamabad has evaporated. "The United States uses Pakistan and then turns its back on the country as soon as Washington no longer needs its assistance," he wrote. His conclusion was pointed: "Pakistan may believe it is playing Trump for a fool, but the opposite may be true. Pakistan will never collect on Trump promises." The analysis suggests that whatever diplomatic capital Munir believes he is accumulating may prove illusory once Washington's immediate regional objectives are met.