Tony O'Sullivan, CEO of global internet service provider RETN, has warned that deep-sea cable-cutting technology functions as a tool of hybrid warfare whose primary power lies in psychological deterrence rather than physical destruction — drawing a direct parallel to nuclear weapons. Speaking in Hong Kong, O'Sullivan argued that the threat of severing undersea cables is more destabilising than any actual cut, as 17 Asian and European nations have accelerated collaboration on seabed defence strategies in recent months.

The nuclear analogy

O'Sullivan was unequivocal in framing cable-cutter technology as a deterrent instrument. 'It does not have quite the same devastating impact with a single use, but it is exactly like a nuclear weapon in a sense that it is not the actual use of it, [but] the threat of the use of it is the bigger issue,' he said. He added that the goal is 'creating an unease in a population with the threat that something might actually happen, and therefore disturbing their normal operations of government or political system.'

Why it matters

The seabed has emerged as the newest front in geopolitical competition. From the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline to China's reported development of deep-sea cable-cutting technology, undersea infrastructure is now firmly in the crosshairs of state-level strategic planning. Despite the urgency, the two largest marine powers — China and the United States — were notably absent from the 17-nation collaborative framework, raising questions about the initiative's scope and effectiveness.

The real threat: network naivety

O'Sullivan stressed that deliberate cable sabotage is not the primary danger he foresees. Most cable disruptions to date have been accidental, and he believes the more pressing vulnerability is structural. 'I do not see the actual idea of cable cuts as the threat. I see the threat to the internet more coming from naivety about network design,' he said. This framing shifts the policy conversation from military countermeasures toward resilient infrastructure planning and redundancy architecture.

Competitive backdrop

The South China Sea, the Red Sea, and chokepoints around Taiwan have all seen elevated cable-security concerns in recent years. Disruptions near the Red Sea during the Ukraine conflict period and ongoing tensions in Asia have pushed governments in Europe, Japan, Britain, and Central Asia to reassess their dependence on submarine cable networks. The International Cable Protection Committee has also intensified its engagement with member states on threat mitigation protocols.

What's next

With China and the United States outside the current multilateral framework, the effectiveness of any coordinated seabed defence strategy remains limited. The industry will be watching whether the 17-nation coalition expands its membership, and whether RETN and peers accelerate investment in network redundancy to reduce single-point-of-failure risks across critical global internet corridors.