China's 'lying flat' movement — the rejection of careerist competition by disillusioned young Chinese — has been traced to the long shadow of the country's one-child policy and a lopsided, manufacturing-heavy growth model, according to a new report published by Japan Times. The analysis argues that decades of suppressed household consumption and intense job-market pressure have created a generation that feels work no longer pays off.

How the one-child policy reshaped consumption

The one-child policy reduced the number of high-consumption households and weakened household bargaining power, the report said. Yi Fuxian, a senior scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, was quoted as saying that the share of household disposable income in GDP fell from about two-thirds in the 1980s to roughly 44 per cent today.

That drop, the report noted, dragged down domestic consumption and job creation, while pushing Beijing to lean heavily on industrial subsidies — fuelling what it described as a 'pathological manufacturing boom'.

The skewed global footprint

The imbalance is now striking on the global ledger. 'China now accounts for 17 per cent of global GDP and 28 per cent of global manufacturing value-added, but only 12 per cent of global household consumption,' the report noted.

A thinning social safety net, it added, has forced workers to clock longer hours simply to stay afloat. The average Chinese work week has climbed to around 49 hours — and as high as 60 hours in some cases — compared with 38 hours in the United States, 33 in Germany, 37 in Japan and 42 in Vietnam, according to the report.

A demographic feedback loop

Long working hours, the report warned, are eroding time for relationships, marriage and child-rearing, deepening China's demographic decline. The result is a feedback loop: a shrinking, ageing population that further weakens consumption and tightens the labour squeeze on those still working.

Graduates without a services economy to absorb them

The report flagged a sharp mismatch between rising educational attainment and an undersized services sector. Annual graduates have surged from 1.01 million in 2000 to 12.22 million in 2025, but services — the main employer for recent graduates — accounts for only about 47 per cent of jobs, far below levels in advanced economies.

Many young Chinese, the report stressed, do not even have the 'privilege of lying flat'. Unable to find stable employment or fall back on family support, they are pushed into the gig economy — as food delivery workers, ride-hailing drivers, couriers and live-streamers.

What lies ahead

With consumption stuck, manufacturing overbuilt and demographics tilting against recovery, the report suggests China's 'lying flat' phenomenon is less a cultural fad than a structural symptom. How Beijing rebalances household incomes against industrial subsidies will shape whether the next generation opts in — or further opts out.