Islamic State shifts to radicalisation modules in South India, agencies warn
Synopsis
Indian security officials are sounding the alarm over a calculated pivot by the Islamic State in South India — no more terror modules, no attack planning. Instead, IS is running a covert radicalisation campaign designed to stay invisible to conventional intelligence tools, filling space vacated by the banned PFI and weakened NTJ, with Tamil Nadu and Kerala as its primary theatres.
Key Takeaways
The Islamic State has shifted strategy in South India , replacing terror module formation with exclusive focus on radicalisation, according to intelligence officials.
Intelligence Bureau officials warn the approach is 'extremely difficult to counter' as radicalised individuals leave far fewer investigative trails than terror cells.
IS followers have been instructed to hold conversations in pairs — at restaurants, colleges and offices — and avoid large gatherings that attract security attention.
The ideological vacuum left by the National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ) and the banned Popular Front of India (PFI) was rapidly filled by the Islamic State.
Agencies are not ruling out lone-wolf attacks by highly radicalised individuals, citing the Coimbatore incident as a precedent.
Tamil Nadu and Kerala have been described by officials as the primary laboratories for this radicalisation push.
The Islamic State (IS) has adopted a significant strategic shift in South India, moving away from setting up terror modules aimed at carrying out attacks and instead focusing exclusively on radicalising individuals, according to security officials. Intelligence agencies warn this approach — harder to detect and counter than conventional terror networks — is spreading rapidly across Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
The New Strategy: Radicalisation Over Attacks
According to an official aware of the developments, the Islamic State is deploying an entirely new method of spreading its influence in South India. Rather than directing followers to establish terror cells or execute strikes, the outfit's communications through its propaganda channels now focus purely on changing mindsets and spreading ideology.
'Terror modules or even lone wolves have trails. An investigation is possible in such cases, but what does one do with a radicalised mind?' an Intelligence Bureau (IB) official said, underlining why the shift is so alarming for security agencies.
The IS reportedly wants the broader mindset of society to change, rather than having individuals carry out discrete acts of violence. However, officials stress they are not ruling out the threat of lone-wolf strikes, particularly by highly radicalised individuals — a pattern seen in the Coimbatore attack in recent years.
How IS Spreads Its Ideology
The outfit has reportedly advised its followers to avoid assembling in large groups to discuss ideology, as such gatherings draw the attention of security agencies. Instead, conversations are conducted between two individuals in everyday settings — restaurants, offices, colleges, or public events.
Beyond word-of-mouth, the Islamic State pushes its propaganda through mouthpiece publications and encrypted channels, instructing followers to supplement digital outreach with personal conversations. The decentralised nature of this model makes it exceptionally difficult to monitor and disrupt.
Filling the Vacuum Left by PFI and NTJ
Security officials say the IS rapidly exploited the operational vacuum created by the weakening of two key outfits. The National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ), responsible for the devastating Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka, was significantly crippled after those attacks triggered a massive crackdown. Before the bombings, then-NTJ chief Mohammed Bahrain Hashim had visited Tamil Nadu on multiple occasions and attempted to establish terror modules; after his death, the outfit largely collapsed.
Similarly, the Popular Front of India (PFI) was banned in September 2022, leaving a large ideological space behind. The Islamic State was able to absorb many former NTJ and PFI followers, according to officials, owing to shared ideological foundations — including advocacy for jihad, the establishment of an Islamic state, and the imposition of Sharia law.
'The NTJ and PFI both propagated jihad while promoting the setting up of an Islamic nation. Many who were followers of those groups moved towards the Islamic State, and this benefited the group enormously,' an official said.
Why Radicalisation Is Harder to Counter Than Terror Modules
Officials describe radicalisation-only modules as more resilient than traditional terror cells. A group that does not plan attacks leaves far fewer digital or physical trails, making preemptive law enforcement intervention considerably more difficult. 'Having an entire society that is radicalised and is against the concept of an Indian state is far more dangerous than carrying out terror attacks,' an official warned.
The IS calculus appears to be that terror modules are comparatively fragile — they can be detected, infiltrated, and dismantled — while a diffuse, ideologically committed population is a long-term strategic asset that is far harder to neutralise.
What Agencies Are Watching
Security agencies in Tamil Nadu and Kerala are now grappling with how to address radicalisation at a societal level — a challenge that goes beyond conventional counter-terror tools. The absence of operational chatter or assembly activity that traditionally triggers intelligence alerts means agencies must invest more heavily in community-level monitoring and de-radicalisation outreach.
Officials indicate that the threat is actively evolving, and the coming months will test whether existing frameworks are adequate to address a form of extremism designed specifically to stay beneath the radar.
Point of View
In many ways, a rational adaptation to repeated counter-terror successes — the NTJ was destroyed, the PFI was banned, and operational cells have been rolled up repeatedly. What agencies are now facing is an ideology-first model that deliberately avoids the triggers that conventional surveillance catches. The harder question — one that security briefings rarely answer — is whether India's counter-radicalisation infrastructure in Tamil Nadu and Kerala is anywhere near capable of matching a decentralised, encrypted, word-of-mouth campaign. The Coimbatore bombing showed that radicalisation without a formal module can still translate into violence. The gap between early warning and effective intervention has never been more consequential.
NationPress
16 Sept 2026
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Islamic State's new strategy in South India?
The Islamic State has moved away from setting up terror modules for carrying out attacks and is instead focusing exclusively on radicalising individuals in South India, particularly in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. According to intelligence officials, IS communications through its propaganda and encrypted channels now prioritise changing societal mindsets over planning strikes.
Why are security agencies more concerned about radicalisation modules than terror cells?
An Intelligence Bureau official explained that terror modules and lone-wolf actors leave investigative trails, making them detectable and actionable. A radicalised individual or community, however, does not carry the same signatures — making pre-emptive intervention far harder. Officials have described it as 'an extremely difficult problem to counter.'
How did the weakening of the NTJ and PFI benefit the Islamic State?
The National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ) was severely weakened after the Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka triggered a massive crackdown, while the Popular Front of India (PFI) was banned in September 2022. Many former followers of both outfits, who shared similar ideological beliefs — including jihad, an Islamic state, and Sharia law — moved towards the Islamic State, significantly expanding its base in South India.
How does the Islamic State spread its ideology at the ground level?
IS has instructed followers to avoid large gatherings and instead conduct ideological discussions in pairs at everyday locations such as restaurants, offices, and colleges to avoid detection. This is supplemented by propaganda disseminated through encrypted digital channels, creating a dual word-of-mouth and online outreach model.
Is a physical terror attack still a threat despite this shift in strategy?
Yes. Security agencies have explicitly stated they are not ruling out lone-wolf attacks by highly radicalised individuals even as IS reduces its focus on formal terror modules. Officials cited the Coimbatore attack as an example of how deep radicalisation can still translate into physical violence.
