Pakistan's long-standing approach to militant groups — a framework that researchers have described as distinguishing between 'good militants' and 'bad militants' — has generated severe long-term consequences, with several armed organisations evolving well beyond the state's ability to control them, according to a detailed report. The findings draw on data and analysis from multiple international policy institutes, including the Brookings Institution.

The Human Cost: 72,000 Dead Since 2000

According to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), more than 72,000 people have been killed in terrorism-related violence in Pakistan since March 2000. The breakdown is stark: over 23,000 civilians, more than 38,000 militants, and upwards of 11,000 security forces personnel have lost their lives in that period. The figures, cited in a report by Assahifa, place Pakistan among the countries most severely affected by sustained militant violence globally.

The 'Good Militants, Bad Militants' Framework

According to an analysis by the Brookings Institution, Pakistan's security establishment for years differentiated between militant organisations considered aligned with the country's strategic interests and those regarded as direct threats to the state itself. Researchers argue that this distinction was not arbitrary — it was shaped by regional security calculations dating back several decades, including Pakistan's role as a key base for supporting Afghan fighters during the Cold War.

Parts of the infrastructure created during that Cold War-era mobilisation reportedly remained in place long after the conflict ended, providing an organisational foundation that outlasted its original purpose. According to researchers, groups deemed strategically useful were tolerated or supported, while organisations that turned their violence inward toward the Pakistani state were treated as security threats.

Unintended Consequences and Proliferation of Extremism

Researchers argue that this selective approach contributed directly to the proliferation of militant organisations across Pakistan and the broader spread of extremist ideology. The policy, they contend, placed compounding security, social, and economic burdens on the country — burdens that have grown heavier as some groups evolved beyond state oversight.

Notably, the Brookings Institution and other analysts conclude that relying on non-state armed groups to pursue short-term strategic objectives creates long-term security risks, citing Pakistan's experience as a cautionary example. 'Relying on non-state armed groups to pursue short-term strategic objectives can create long-term security risks,' the Brookings analysis states, as cited in the report.

Geopolitical Leverage vs. Strategic Blowback

Reports acknowledge that the approach did provide Islamabad with measurable geopolitical leverage during certain periods and supported aspects of its regional strategy — particularly in Afghanistan. However, the same analyses argue that the trade-off has proven deeply unfavourable over the long run. The distinction between groups serving strategic objectives and those threatening internal stability proved difficult to maintain as militant networks grew more complex and interconnected.

What Analysts Say Going Forward

International policy institutes increasingly frame Pakistan's experience as a structural warning for states that use non-state armed actors as instruments of foreign policy. The core lesson drawn by researchers is that short-term tactical gains from such arrangements tend to be outweighed by the erosion of state control and the normalisation of armed extremism. Pakistan's path forward, analysts suggest, will require dismantling the institutional and ideological infrastructure built over decades — a task complicated by the very depth of those roots.