Turkey's ASEAN strategy overlooks sea routes, maritime gaps persist
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
Turkey's engagement with Southeast Asia remains anchored to a predominantly land-based vision, leaving a critical maritime dimension underexplored, according to an analysis published in India Narrative by analyst Mehmet Enes Beşer. The piece argues that while Ankara positions itself as a continental bridge, the shipping lanes, undersea cables, and transshipment hubs that actually drive Turkey-ASEAN commerce receive little strategic attention.
The Maritime Reality Turkey Is Missing
Approximately 96 per cent of the roughly 10 million containers moving between China and Europe annually travel by sea. For Turkey's relationship with ASEAN nations, maritime transport is not a secondary option — it is the primary commercial artery. The analysis notes that container vessels, oil tankers, and undersea cables are already connecting Turkey and Southeast Asia; it is Ankara's policy framework that has yet to catch up with that operational reality.
Bureaucratic Silos Blocking Coordination
A structural problem compounds the strategic blind spot. Ankara's bureaucracy is reportedly fragmented across departments that operate in isolation: one division handles Southeast Asia, another covers the Gulf and East Africa, energy officials monitor suppliers separately from transport officials managing ports, while trade agencies focus on customs and digital agencies oversee cables. Ships and shipping routes, the analysis points out, do not recognise such administrative divisions.
The report argues there is no need to build an entirely new institution. The coordination architecture already established under Asia Anew — Turkey's existing regional outreach initiative — could host a small Indian Ocean working track that brings together both public agencies and commercial operators. Its immediate mandate, the piece suggests, should be to map Turkey's actual exposure along the route: the ports and transshipment hubs it relies on, major cable corridors, energy flows, and insurance risks at each chokepoint.
Undersea Cables and the Digital Agenda
Submarine cables carry more than 99 per cent of international data traffic, making them a critical infrastructure layer in Turkey-ASEAN connectivity. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has flagged the Red Sea as a key cable corridor where access constraints can delay repairs — a vulnerability with direct implications for both regions.
The analysis identifies this as a concrete area for joint action. Since most cables are privately owned, governments are unlikely to manage the networks directly. They can, however, reduce regulatory delays and streamline access for repair vessels — a practical step that could yield tangible gains without requiring large public investment.
Practical Cooperation Over Grand Strategy
The report is sceptical of Turkey pursuing an 'Indian Ocean strategy' framed around brand-building or great-power signalling, arguing it would generate little resonance within ASEAN. Instead, it recommends a functional approach: selecting two or three port-to-port projects with ASEAN partners and setting realistic targets around electronic documentation, cold-chain logistics, data exchange, and greener transport standards.
Being genuinely helpful — assisting ports operationally, sharing technical expertise, and supporting regional institutions quietly — is presented as more effective than announcing headline initiatives. As geopolitical competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, Turkey's most credible path to relevance in Southeast Asia may lie not in strategic declarations but in unglamorous, practical maritime cooperation.