Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has significantly ramped up efforts to build a pan-India influencer network aimed at spreading disinformation and shaping narratives against the Indian government and armed forces, according to Intelligence Bureau (IB) officials. The push intensified in the direct aftermath of Operation Sindoor, India's military strikes on terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), which were carried out in response to the Pahalgam terror attack that killed 26 people.

Why ISI Turned to Influencers

Indian intelligence officials say Pakistan has concluded it cannot match India militarily after Operation Sindoor exposed the reach and precision of Indian armed forces. The ISI's pivot to influence operations is, according to officials, a calculated response to that asymmetry.

The groundwork for this strategy was reportedly laid using Shehzad Bhatti, a former influencer who allegedly helped the ISI construct multiple terror modules inside India. According to officials, the operation was considered a success, convincing the ISI that social media influencers offered a more scalable and harder-to-detect method of penetrating Indian society than conventional recruitment.

The Mechanics of the Soft Push

Officials say the ISI has instructed its network to adopt a 'soft push' strategy — producing content that appears to raise legitimate grievances rather than overt anti-state propaganda. This approach, they note, is deliberately designed to evade scrutiny by Indian intelligence and cyber crime agencies.

'The idea is to create as much content as possible and then influence people into believing that everything around them is wrong,' an official said. For ordinary viewers, such videos may appear to address real issues. The underlying objective, however, is to amplify those issues to the point of inciting public distrust, protests, or, in the worst case, violence against the state, officials warned.

Intelligence officials acknowledge that monitoring millions of accounts across social media and video platforms presents a formidable challenge. Agencies must first map the content-generation pattern before they can act, officials noted.

Bengal Module: From Disinformation to Assassination Plot

A concrete example of the network's scope emerged from an ongoing probe by the Special Task Force (STF) in West Bengal. Investigators found that two individuals were building a local influencer module with dual objectives: narrative manipulation and active espionage.

The module was reportedly gathering intelligence on sensitive locations and the movement routes of high-profile individuals, including state ministers. The STF found that the network was particularly focused on West Bengal Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari — specifically his unguarded routes — with what officials described as an apparent plan to assassinate him.

Officials say several such modules have been dismantled since Operation Sindoor, but stress that the ISI has shown no signs of scaling back its influencer strategy.

The Broader Threat Landscape

Beyond individual modules, intelligence officials frame the ISI influencer network as a long-term information warfare campaign. The dual mandate — recruiting for terror groups while simultaneously seeding disinformation — makes these networks more dangerous than conventional sleeper cells, officials argue.

Indian agencies, including the IB and cyber crime units, are now working to identify patterns in content generation before moving to enforcement. The challenge, officials concede, is the sheer volume: millions of accounts operating across platforms make real-time tracking extremely difficult. How quickly agencies can develop automated detection capabilities may determine the effectiveness of India's counter-response.