Pakistan's bid to position itself as a mediator between the United States and Iran has delivered a mixed diplomatic harvest — briefly elevating Islamabad's international profile while simultaneously exposing it to a set of compounding strategic risks. Chief among these: a cooling of relations with Saudi Arabia, growing suspicion in both Washington and Tehran, and an uncomfortable dependence on China and Qatar to actually drive the talks forward.

Saudi Arabia's Unease

The mediation exercise has unsettled Riyadh, which has long regarded Pakistan as a strategic partner — a relationship reinforced by the 2025 Strategic Defence and Military Agreement (SDMA). Saudi Arabia expected Islamabad to remain firmly aligned with Gulf security priorities. Instead, Pakistan's visible embrace of Iran — including hosting Iranian delegations in Islamabad and giving Tehran's leadership a public platform — was read in Riyadh as legitimising Iran's position.

An article published in March on the website of the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank, warned that if Iranian attacks against Saudi Arabia resume, Riyadh will expect Pakistan to actively contribute to its defence under the terms of their security agreement. The same analysis cautioned that Pakistan's relationship with the United Arab Emirates has already been affected by the conflict, with the UAE demanding repayment of a major loan.

'If the fragile US-Iran ceasefire falters, Pakistan's balancing act among the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia will likely become untenable,' the Stimson article warned.

The Military-Led Diplomacy Problem

Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir projected himself as personally steering negotiations with Iran's Revolutionary Guards — a military-heavy approach that raised additional concerns in Riyadh that Islamabad was prioritising Iran's trust over Gulf sensitivities. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar also engaged in what reports described as 'shuttle communication' between Tehran and Riyadh, securing assurances that Saudi soil would not be used against Iran — a move that briefly constrained Iranian strikes.

An opinion piece in Al Jazeera — the Qatari-funded pan-Arab broadcaster — noted in March that the 2025 SDMA 'is being tested under conditions neither side anticipated.' It observed that when Iranian drones and missiles struck Gulf targets, Pakistan condemned both the US-Israel role in the killing of Ayatollah Khamenei and Iran's retaliatory strikes — an attempt to appear balanced that satisfied neither side fully.

The piece quoted analysts as saying that Islamabad 'likely never expected to find itself caught between Tehran and Riyadh, particularly after the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.'

Dependence on China and Qatar

Despite projecting itself as a primary negotiator, Pakistan has leaned heavily on other powers to provide the actual diplomatic architecture. A joint statement by Pakistan and China on 31 March, along with their five-point plan to end the conflict involving Iran, was seen as an acknowledgement of Pakistan's limitations as a standalone mediator, according to the Stimson Center analysis. The plan effectively required a major global actor — in this case, China — to underpin Islamabad's efforts.

More recently, the latest ceasefire attempt in Switzerland was reportedly steered quietly by Qatar, not Pakistan. Several reports indicate that Iranian state media has consistently downplayed Pakistan's mediation role in US-Iran talks while highlighting Qatar as the more credible and effective broker — a framing that undercuts Islamabad's claim to a central seat at the table.

The Structural Bind

Pakistan's neutral posture is now under severe strain from multiple directions. Its defence pact ties it institutionally to Saudi Arabia, while geography, economic necessity, and sectarian dynamics create unavoidable linkages with Iran. Analysts quoted in recent commentary suggest that if regional volatility is not contained soon, Islamabad will find it increasingly difficult to sustain this balancing act without paying a concrete cost on at least one front.

Whether Pakistan can convert its diplomatic visibility into durable influence — rather than accumulated liability — will depend largely on whether the US-Iran ceasefire holds and whether Riyadh ultimately views Islamabad's role as helpful or as a betrayal of Gulf solidarity.