Pakistan's self-styled role as a mediator between the United States and Iran is not rooted in neutrality but is shaped by its deepening strategic dependence on China, according to an analysis by geopolitical expert Sergio Restelli published in the Times of Israel. The report argues that Beijing's interests — not Islamabad's independent judgement — ultimately define the terms of any Pakistani diplomatic intervention in the West Asia conflict.

The Mediation Claim and Its Context

Restelli, an Italian political advisor and author, writes that Pakistan is positioning itself as a broker that can appear useful to Washington, credible to Tehran, acceptable to the Gulf states, and responsible before the wider Muslim world. However, he argues this presentation obscures a structural reality: Islamabad's strategic calculus is inseparable from its relationship with Beijing.

He traces this dependency to territorial concessions, pointing to the Shaksgam Valley in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir — ceded to China — as a foundational marker of the relationship's asymmetry. The analysis situates Pakistan's current diplomatic posture within this longer historical arc.

The Arms Dependency Argument

Citing data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Restelli notes that Pakistan's arms imports rose by 66 per cent between 2021 and 2025, with China accounting for 80 per cent of the total. He argues this figure is not evidence of diversification but of structural dependency.

'A country whose military hardware, air defence, aircraft, naval systems and strategic confidence increasingly come from one supplier cannot pretend that its geopolitical judgement is entirely independent of that supplier,' Restelli writes. The breadth of Chinese supply — spanning platforms, systems, and strategic confidence — is presented as evidence that neutrality is structurally unavailable to Pakistan.

What China Wants From the Arrangement

According to Restelli, China's core interest in the West Asia conflict is neither an Iranian victory nor anti-American posturing. Rather, Beijing seeks stability on terms that protect its energy supply chains, restrain US escalation, preserve its ties with Tehran, and prevent a regional war from disrupting Chinese trade routes.

'Pakistan's mediation gives China a useful instrument,' he writes. 'Islamabad can speak where Beijing prefers not to stand too visibly. Pakistan can carry messages, test proposals, reassure Iran, engage Washington and signal to the Gulf, while China remains the larger power in the background.' This framing casts Pakistan less as an independent actor and more as a front-channel for Chinese diplomatic interests.

The Sentiment vs. Strategy Gap

Restelli also addresses the rhetorical scaffolding around the China-Pakistan relationship, which in 2025 marked its 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties. Phrases such as 'all-weather friendship', 'iron brotherhood', 'higher than the Himalayas', and 'deeper than the ocean' are, he argues, emotional language deployed to obscure a colder strategic transaction.

'Behind the theatre lies a colder truth. Pakistan's loyalty lies with China because its strategic survival increasingly depends on China,' he writes. This distinction — between the language of sentiment and the logic of dependency — is central to his critique of Pakistan's credibility as a neutral mediator.

Implications for US-Iran Diplomacy

The analysis raises pointed questions about how Washington and Tehran should weigh Pakistani diplomatic overtures. If Islamabad's mediation ultimately reflects Beijing's preferences, any messages it carries or proposals it floats would need to be assessed through that lens. The report stops short of recommending a specific policy response, but its logic implies that treating Pakistan as a genuinely neutral broker could lead both sides to misread the channel. How the US-Iran nuclear and security negotiations evolve will likely test whether Pakistan's intermediary role holds up under scrutiny.