Pakistan turns to terror networks as Afghan influence collapses
Synopsis
Key Takeaways
As Pakistan's conventional leverage over Afghanistan continues to erode, Islamabad appears to be falling back on a well-worn playbook: selectively tolerating terrorist organisations to preserve strategic footholds. Analysts cited in a recent report argue that Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) networks remain operationally active in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, with some cells allegedly surviving due to tolerance — or outright support — from elements within Pakistan's security establishment.
Strategic Depth Doctrine in Ruins
For decades, Pakistani military and intelligence planners pursued what they termed 'strategic depth' — the belief that a compliant government in Kabul would provide Pakistan a buffer against India and shield its western flank. That calculation has now unravelled. According to the report published in American Thinker, when the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Islamabad anticipated compliance: acceptance of the Durand Line, suppression of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and continued dependence on Pakistani trade corridors.
Instead, the Taliban asserted independence. Relations between Islamabad and Kabul have since deteriorated into border clashes, airstrikes, economic pressure, and mutual accusations of sponsoring terrorism — a sharp reversal from the partnership Pakistan had long cultivated.
Pakistan's Confrontational Shift
Pakistani officials have adopted an increasingly combative posture. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif declared in February 2026 that our cup of patience has overflowed
and that an open war had begun — language that analysts say marks a significant public escalation in the bilateral breakdown.
The Taliban, for their part, have accused Pakistan of permitting ISKP infrastructure to operate from its soil, pointing to the cross-border movement and survival of ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari, as well as alleged training camps inside Pakistan. In June 2026, the Taliban claimed to have carried out strikes on sites in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that they linked to ISKP, according to the report.
ISKP: The Taliban's Most Dangerous Adversary
ISKP remains the Taliban's most formidable jihadist rival. Unlike the Taliban, whose agenda is primarily centred on Afghanistan, ISKP adheres to the Islamic State's transnational ideology and regards the Taliban as illegitimate rulers. Since 2021, the Taliban have waged an aggressive counter-campaign against the group.
The report warns that any Pakistani tolerance of ISKP would directly undermine the Taliban's counterterrorism efforts and risk enabling a more capable and regionally dangerous terrorist network — a dynamic that could destabilise the broader South and Central Asian security architecture.
The Wakhan Corridor and China's Role
A separate but connected theatre is the Wakhan Corridor — the narrow strip of land that gives Afghanistan its only direct border with China's Xinjiang region. Kabul is constructing a road toward China, and as of May 2026, Afghan authorities reported that roughly 70 percent of the route was complete.
A functioning corridor would allow Afghanistan to trade directly with China without routing goods through Pakistani territory, thereby reducing Islamabad's historic leverage over landlocked Kabul. It would also diminish the relative importance of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for Afghan cargo. The report suggests that sustained instability in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province and around the Wakhan Corridor could serve Pakistan's interests by giving Beijing grounds to delay direct connectivity — preserving Pakistan's position as China's primary western partner.
What Comes Next
The convergence of a collapsing Pakistan-Taliban relationship, alleged ISKP tolerance, and the race to complete the Wakhan road creates a volatile regional triangle. Analysts warn that without a recalibration of Islamabad's Afghanistan policy, the region faces a prolonged period of proxy conflict and cross-border instability that could draw in both China and Central Asian states.