Taliban-era crime in Afghanistan up 60% since 2021, report finds
Synopsis
Nearly five years after seizing power on a promise of order, the Taliban's own Interior Ministry data shows crime in Afghanistan has risen 60% — with theft doubling and murders up 15%. A new report argues this is not governance failure by accident: a security apparatus built to crush dissent, it finds, is structurally ill-suited to protect ordinary citizens from gangs, extortion, and armed robbery.
Key Takeaways
Total criminal cases in Afghanistan rose from 10,834 to 17,320 between 2021–22 and 2024–25 — a 60% increase , per Taliban Interior Ministry data.
Murder cases climbed from 1,502 to 1,734 (up more than 15% ); theft cases doubled from 3,102 to 6,225 .
Crime has been reported across all regions — from Helmand and Herat to Kabul , Balkh , and Badakhshan .
A Stringer Asia report argues the Taliban's security apparatus prioritises suppressing dissent over combating ordinary crime.
Media restrictions in Afghanistan mean the true scale of criminal activity is likely underreported even in official figures.
Criminal incidents across Afghanistan have surged by nearly 60% since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, according to a report by Stringer Asia, which cites figures drawn from the Taliban's own Interior Ministry data. The findings directly contradict the regime's repeated claims of having restored order and security following the fall of Kabul.
What the Data Shows
According to data published by the Taliban Interior Ministry in November 2025 and reported in January 2026, total criminal cases rose from 10,834 in the solar hijri year 1400 (March 2021–March 2022) to 17,320 in 1403 (March 2024–March 2025) — a rise of approximately 60%. Murder cases climbed from 1,502 to 1,734, an increase of more than 15%. Theft cases doubled, from 3,102 to 6,225.
The report notes that these are figures the Taliban itself released, making the scale of deterioration particularly striking. Given that Afghanistan remains under stringent media restrictions, the true extent of criminality is, according to the report, likely far greater than these numbers indicate.
A Security State Built to Control, Not Protect
The Stringer Asia report draws a sharp distinction between the Taliban's capacity for political repression and its apparent inability — or unwillingness — to address ordinary crime. 'The Taliban's security state is not built to protect society. It is built to control it,' the report states. 'It is highly efficient when the target is a woman seeking education, a journalist asking questions, a former official, a protester, a musician, a civil society activist, or anyone who challenges the regime's authority. It is far less effective when the threat comes from gangs, armed robbers, extortion networks, drug economies, or Taliban-linked actors operating under the cover of power.'
The report argues that this asymmetry is not incidental: 'The state sees dissent more clearly than it sees crime, because dissent threatens the regime. Crime merely feeds the ecosystem around it.'
Geographic Spread of Crime
Reported incidents of homicide, armed robbery, theft, assault, extortion, and gang activity span the country — from Helmand in the south to Badakhshan in the northeast, from Herat in the west to Kabul in the centre, and across northern provinces including Balkh, Parwan, Faryab, and Jawzjan. The breadth of the data, the report argues, rules out regional anomalies and points to a systemic pattern.
Governance Failures Behind the Numbers
The report characterises Taliban-ruled Afghanistan not as a 'stable Islamic order' but as a 'coercive and criminalised landscape where state violence is organised but public safety remains elusive.' Despite the ability to issue decrees, enforce punishments, and allocate resources to its security apparatus, the regime has, according to the report, failed to build institutional trust, ensure fair justice, or adequately protect ordinary citizens.
Notably, this assessment comes nearly five years after the Taliban's return — a period long enough to test governance claims beyond the chaos of transition. The report concludes that the persistent rise in murder, theft, and extortion is 'not failure by accident but by design.'
Point of View
The 'restored security' narrative collapses from within. What the figures also reveal is a structural logic: a state that invests heavily in political policing has less institutional bandwidth — and arguably less incentive — to pursue crime that does not threaten its authority. The doubling of theft cases is particularly telling; it signals economic desperation at the household level that no amount of decree-issuing can paper over. Mainstream coverage of Afghanistan tends to focus on women's rights and international recognition; the criminality data deserves equal attention as a measure of everyday state failure.
NationPress
20 Jun 2026
Frequently Asked Questions
How much has crime risen in Afghanistan under Taliban rule?
According to Taliban Interior Ministry data cited in a Stringer Asia report, total criminal cases in Afghanistan rose approximately 60% — from 10,834 in 2021–22 to 17,320 in 2024–25. Murder cases increased by more than 15% and theft cases doubled over the same period.
Where does the crime data on Afghanistan come from?
The figures were published by the Taliban's own Interior Ministry in November 2025 and reported in January 2026. The Stringer Asia report notes that, given Afghanistan's strict media restrictions, the actual scale of crime is likely higher than official data reflects.
Which parts of Afghanistan are most affected by rising crime?
The report documents incidents across the country — including Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Badakhshan, Balkh, Parwan, Faryab, and Jawzjan — suggesting the rise in crime is a nationwide pattern rather than a regional problem.
Why has the Taliban failed to control crime despite its security apparatus?
The Stringer Asia report argues that the Taliban's security state is designed primarily to suppress political dissent rather than protect citizens from ordinary crime. It is described as highly effective against journalists, protesters, and civil society activists, but far less so against gangs, extortion networks, and armed robbers.
What is the significance of this report for understanding Taliban governance?
The report directly challenges the Taliban's central claim of having restored order after decades of conflict. By using the regime's own data, it argues that Afghanistan under Taliban rule is not a stable order but a 'coercive and criminalised landscape' where public safety remains elusive despite heavy security spending.
